



# GENDERED IMPLICATIONS OF COVID-19 IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY

The Case of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis



**GENDERED IMPLICATIONS OF  
COVID-19  
IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY: THE CASE  
OF GAZİANTEP, ŞANLIURFA AND  
KİLİS**

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# Abbreviations

<b>A</b>	Agree
<b>DA</b>	Disagree
<b>HH</b>	Household Head
<b>IPID</b>	Insurance Product Information Document
<b>NS</b>	Neutral
<b>SA</b>	Strongly Agree
<b>SD</b>	Strongly Disagree
<b>SR</b>	Syrian Refugees
<b>TR</b>	Local People
<b>TURKSTAT</b>	Turkish Statistical Institute
<b>TPID</b>	Temporary Protection Identification Documents

# Introduction

## General View of the COVID-19 from a Gender Lens

With the first wave of migration from Syria to Turkey that started in 2011, Turkey turned into a destination country for refugees while keeping its position as a transit and migrant-producing country. Turkey, which hosts now 4 million refugees and asylum seekers according to November 2021 data<sup>1</sup>, has been the country with the highest refugee population in the world since 2016. Syrians make up 3.7 million of the refugee and asylum seeker population of the country.

The vast majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey under 'temporary protection status'<sup>2</sup> live in cities and rural settlements. Syrian refugees in camps are only around 1%<sup>3</sup>. Southeast of Turkey is the region with the highest refugee population. Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa, where this survey took place, are located in the Southeast region and also provinces along the Syrian border. Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa host 461,053, 106,831 and 428,355 refugees, respectively, and the ratios of the Syrian population to the total provincial population are 0.22, 0.75 and 0.20, respectively<sup>4</sup>.

The regional distribution of Syrians in Turkey is as: 41% of all the registered Syrians reside in Kilis, Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Mardin. Excluding these border provinces, which also mostly carry out agricultural activities, 20% of the Syrians live in agricultural regions such as Adana, Mersin, Osmaniye, Kahramanmaraş, Konya, Aydın, and Sakarya. Excluding the border provinces once more, the Syrians in important industrial provinces of Turkey such as Kayseri, Bursa, İstanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli, Denizli, and İzmir are at 28.8%. In contrast, only 0.7% of them live in the foremost tourism provinces of Turkey such as Balıkesir, Muğla, Antalya, Sinop, and Çanakkale. The number of Syrians registered in 18 provinces of the Black Sea region, extending from its east to west, is around 30 thousand, corresponding to only 0.8% of all the registered Syrians in Turkey.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, first, it is more reasonable to conduct surveys about the registered Syrians, mainly in the border provinces in the south and southeast; secondly, in the regions that depend on rural

<sup>1</sup> [https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2022/01/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-NovDec-2021f\\_TR.pdf](https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2022/01/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-NovDec-2021f_TR.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Turkish state does not grant refugee status to Syrians due to geographical limitation. Syrians' rights are regulated under a status briefly and commonly called as 'Temporary Protection Status'.

<sup>3</sup> <https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27>

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/> Access: 23.06.2021

productivity, and thirdly in the industrial provinces. Undoubtedly, surveys conducted within the scope of each province or region's specific features would provide more meaningful data; however, the three routes mentioned before are the provinces most frequently populated by the Syrians, chosen by the authorities for the Syrians, and opted by the Syrians to move. It is also interesting that 99% of the Syrians in Turkey live in urban areas, whereas 60% of the Syrians in Syria are in urban provinces, according to the 2020 data.<sup>6</sup> Comparing the rates of urbanization in Syria, a significant proportion of the Syrians in Turkey experiences urbanization together with being immigrants and refugees.

Syrians are living among locals in same residential areas. They work, go to school together; they get health services from the same hospitals. The livelihood of Syrians living in both urban and rural settlements is based on their own labor. Although scattered in various business areas, the majority of the Syrian population is engaged in production-oriented jobs such as textile, leather, shoemaking, woodworking and metalworking; as well they have jobs in service-oriented sectors such as construction, care, transportation and cleaning. In addition to these, a significant portion of Syrian refugees work as seasonal agricultural workers and a substantial number has established their own businesses. However, their lives in Turkey have been precarious in various ways<sup>7</sup>.

The global COVID-19 pandemic affected lives of Syrian and local communities adversely. As of 31<sup>st</sup> of May 2021, there were approximately 5.2 million confirmed COVID-19 cases and 47,000 deaths in Turkey<sup>8</sup>. CARE assessments, including the COVID-19 Impact Assessment and RGA, demonstrated the impact of COVID-19 on Syrian refugees' ability to meet their basic needs as income earning opportunities and informal work were further constrained.

It appears that the COVID-19 pandemic has fundamentally changed a great number of practices in daily life, such as work, education, and socialization. All societies in the world have been affected by this change at different levels according to their status, power, and geography. This earth-shattering process has not ended yet, and even in the middle of 2021, it is still impossible to foresee the course of events. Although nobody can predict the future of this pandemic, everybody agrees with its striking and transformative impact on the earth. The COVID-19 has already taken its place in history as one of the biggest global

<sup>6</sup>[https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report\\_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tb ar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=SYR](https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tb ar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=SYR) Access: 23.06.2021

<sup>7</sup> Baban, F., Ilcan, S., & Rygiel, K. (2017). Syrian refugees in Turkey: pathways to precarity, differential inclusion, and negotiated citizenship rights. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 43(1), 41-57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1192996>

<sup>8</sup> <https://covid19.saglik.gov.tr/TR-66935/genel-koronavirus-tablosu.html>



disasters after and it is clear that the future's world history is now in a radical transformation due to the COVID-19 pandemic going with global warming and environmental disasters.

Apart from its being a pandemic, it is impossible to analyze COVID-19 without considering the differences of class, geography, and gender. Especially taking into account social class and gender factors, it is observed during the pandemic that women had to face unemployment more frequently and their imposed responsibilities for domestic work and caring have blazingly increased. This increase in the amount of their responsibilities is seen heavily in the lives of women who are employed in the sectors such as health and service since they are affected more by the pandemic. Secondly, due to temporary cessations in educational and care services provided to children, women's burden with the household chores is adversely affected.<sup>9</sup> The other most affected groups are individuals with disabilities, homeless, elderly, unemployed, immigrants, refugees, people with chronic illnesses, and people without any documents.<sup>10</sup>

Among the prominent results of the survey called "The economic and social impact of COVID-19 on women and men: rapid gender assessment of COVID-19 implications in Turkey" conducted by UN Women in Turkey, it is seen that women have more frequently lost their jobs and taken more time off from work<sup>11</sup>. More women have changed their workplaces and started working from home. Additionally, it is observed that migrant women were subjected to gender discrimination more frequently during the pandemic, for example, in terms of accessing health services.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, migrant women, also the migrant men, have encountered harder conditions in terms of unemployment, becoming invisible, getting health services, and access to education and remote learning opportunities.<sup>13</sup>

Right to education has been affected negatively during the pandemic, especially for girls from vulnerable groups such as migrants and refugees, and its long-term effects need examination. While they have already been struggling with hard conditions and poverty in their daily lives through various means, there is a big question mark over to what extent they have the opportunity to access remote learning. Additionally, it is known that children, particularly girls, have to take more responsibilities for domestic chores in this process. Children being out of school, girls at early ages being married off, children's educational

<sup>9</sup> ILO (2018). Care work and care jobs for the future of decent work

<sup>10</sup> ILO (2020). COVID-19 and the world of work: Impact and policy responses

<sup>11</sup> <https://eca.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%20Office%20ECA/Attachments/Publications/2020/06/Rapid%20Gender%20Assessment%20Report%20Turkey.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> GAR- Göç Araştırmacıları Derneği (2020). Göçmenlerin İstanbul'daki Sağlık Hizmetlerine Erişimlerinin Önündeki Engeller ve Kolaylaştırıcılar Saha Raporu, p.6.

<sup>13</sup> Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S.T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Kaya, M., Açıkgöz, Ü., & Özhazar, İ. (2021). *Gaziantep monitor 2020: Syrians*. SABEV Yayınları.

lives being pushed into the background, and increased domestic violence are among the most severe outcomes of COVID-19<sup>14</sup>

Since March 2020, COVID-19 have been deeply influencing Turkey. Despite the differences among regions, provinces, statuses, and genders, this pandemic has left an imprint on everyone's daily life in Turkey. For instance, work practices have been moved from public to private places, workplaces to homes, in a very short time. This intersection of work and private area has caused an increase in the domestic responsibilities which are mostly imposed upon women. Therefore, there is a meaningful social transformation in the lives of women from refugee and host communities.

Attribution of public spaces to men and private spaces to women remains as an issue in the society: The distinction between the masculine public and the feminine private sphere created the spirit of the modern industrial community.<sup>15</sup> It can be asserted that the pandemic process has made this distinction more visible. Becoming obliged to do domestic work during this process has increased the burden on women. The situation is not different for working women. For them, household responsibilities need to be performed in addition to the duties at work. For example, the status of working mothers and the role expectations began to be redefined due to the practices of remote learning and distance working.<sup>16</sup>

Because of the increasing hygiene practices, the shift toward remote learning, and the negatively affected domestic economy, gender-based inequalities at home have become sharper.<sup>17</sup> Since convenient food bought from outside was seen potentially dangerous in spreading the virus, the importance of cleaning and cooking at home has risen. Another reason for the increase in the time for cooking is due to that children started to spend more time at home. Therefore, the escalation in women's responsibilities has become inevitable. Considering these facts together with the conditions of being migrant or refugee, the gravity of the situation has become more obvious.

Furthermore, women's invisible labor at home has required more painstaking effort during the pandemic as the various services provided before the pandemic for daily chores, childcare, and eldercare have been interrupted. Before the pandemic, some households were receiving services from outside, especially from other women, for household chores and caregiving. However, because of the viral risks, this kind of support disappeared.

<sup>14</sup> Aygüneş, A., & Ok, O. C. (2020). Covid-19 Pandemisi Sürecinde Toplumsal Cinsiyet Çalışmaları İzleme Raporu, p. 33, SU Gender (Sabancı Üniversitesi Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Kadın Çalışmaları Mükemmeliyet Merkezi).

<sup>15</sup> Sancar, S. (2013). *Erkeklik: İmkansız İktidar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 53.

<sup>16</sup> Akbaş, Ö. Z. (2020). Koronavirüs (COVID-19) Pandemisi Sürecinde Özel Alanına Kamusal Alanı Sığdıran Çalışan Anneler. *Avrasya Sosyal ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 7(5), pp. 78-94.

<sup>17</sup> Aygüneş, A., & Ok, O. C. (2020, Aralık). *COVID-19 Pandemisi Sürecinde Toplumsal Cinsiyet Çalışmaları İzleme Raporu*. p. 39. Sugender Sabancı Üniversitesi:

[https://sugender.sabanciuniv.edu/sites/sugender.sabanciuniv.edu/files/pandemi\\_raporu.pdf](https://sugender.sabanciuniv.edu/sites/sugender.sabanciuniv.edu/files/pandemi_raporu.pdf) (Acces: 03.07.2021)



Consequently, women have become more responsible for caring for the household members and paying attention to children's meals/courses/plays. Being married or having children affected the time spent on the household chores by women. As the number of children and the elderly living in the household increased, women's labor also went up.<sup>18</sup>

The dominance of men in the public sphere has interfered with the public experiences of women, immigrants, and refugees during the pandemic. Before the pandemic, women could sometimes find a way to legitimize their presence in public areas except for work. For instance, shopping was one of the most important ways for this legitimization because the visibility of women in the public sphere for shopping is based on society's prior approval.<sup>19</sup> The reason for this approval is that shopping malls could provide a "sterile" environment away from assumed dangers/threats, especially to women.<sup>20</sup> However, all women, regardless of their status of being the immigrant/refugee/local, had to stay at home during the COVID-19 process since shopping practices were under some regulations and malls remained closed for a while due to the potential of spreading the virus.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, women's economic participation has also been interrupted. In Turkey, all women, both the Syrians and the locals, must mostly deal with care work within the household. As a result, women, especially the immigrant, and refugee women, encumbered with childcare and eldercare, have become more vulnerable in employment. The domestic burden on women resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has led to women being easily dropped out of the workforce. As women have taken more responsibilities for caregiving, they have been affected by cutbacks or dismissals.<sup>21</sup> Another accelerating reason for the women's dismissal and unemployment during the pandemic is that men are accepted as the household's primary earner in the patriarchal system. In other words, the COVID-19 process has shown that the achievements obtained by women for gender equality through long-term struggles are hanging by a thread and ready to turn into "default settings" in the case of a serious societal or global crisis. Once more, this situation is more sensitive for immigrant and refugee women. As a result, women have more frequently faced inequalities in domestic and public spheres during the

<sup>18</sup> Aygüneş, A., & Ok, O. C. (2020, Aralık), *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Yılmaz, A. (2009). 'Benim Adım Bayram, Herkes Bu Tezgaha Hayran': Kadın-Kent İlişkisinde Sosyete Pazarı Durağı. A. Alkan içinde, *Cins Cins Mekan* (s. 202-216). İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, p. 204.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations. (2020, Nisan 09). *Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Women*. [www.un.org/policy\\_brief\\_on\\_covid\\_impact\\_on\\_women\\_9\\_april\\_2020](http://www.un.org/policy_brief_on_covid_impact_on_women_9_april_2020) (Access: 22.06.2021)

pandemic. Moreover, they have intensely felt the existing imbalanced work distribution in their lives both at home and job.<sup>22</sup>

Apart from the issues given above, some other titles such as household sizes, the education of children and social relations in the households, unemployment, access to health services, problems with education and schooling, and other matters related to jobs and work provide a huge amount of data regarding both the Syrians and the locals.

<sup>22</sup> Koç, E., & Yeniçeri, Z. (2021). COVID-19 Pandemi Sürecinin Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşit(siz)liğine Etkileri. *Akdeniz Kadın Çalışmaları ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Dergisi*, 4(1), 80-102, p. 92.

## The Aim and Scope of the Research

The main aim of this research is to understand the impacts of Global COVID-19 pandemic on Syrians and locals living in the cities of Southeastern Turkey, more specifically Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa, through using a gendered approach. The scope of the research is wide, we conducted a multidimensional survey to grasp the impact of COVID-19 on many topics related to public and private sphere. Education, health, social life, domestic relations, housing, employment, economic conditions, aids, and support from humanitarian institutions are among the dimensions we collected data about.

Besides, a special importance is given to social cohesion, one of the hottest topics since the beginning of the migration. As the conditions of vulnerable groups from both societies have been worsened by the pandemic, the tension among members of two widely defined groups, locals and refugees, is increasing. Therefore, one of our focuses was to understand the neighbor relations taking place in all kinds of encounters in low and middle-income neighborhoods, relations with the authorities, civil society organizations and international humanitarian organizations.

The impact of the pandemic on different genders varies. The main cause of these differences is due the gender roles attributed to men and women. Due to patriarchal order, women are always among the groups feeling the adverse effects of such crisis most deeply. Pandemic worsened the conditions related to domestic duties which widely are expected to be carried out by women at home. For all dimensions of this survey, we attempt to differentiate the effects experienced by women and men separately. In which dimensions the experiences of women and men differ and to what extent were among the special objective during the design process of the survey.

## Survey Field and the Methodology

The presence of the Syrians in social life leads to complicated social relations, legal uncertainties, interactions, and encounters in each province in Turkey. Considering that this approximately 4 million population is far from homogeneity and has considerably various characteristics and tendencies, the information regarding the Syrians is highly significant.

The data on the population of Syrians in Turkey given in the introduction section does not count the number of irregular migrants and Syrian refugees without documents (not registered to any Turkish authority) or Syrians acquired Turkish citizenship. On our design, we do not separate Syrians as holding Turkish citizenship, under temporary protection or without any kind of affiliation to any authority.

All provinces in Turkey host Syrians but in varying rates and numbers<sup>23</sup>. According to the data of mid-2021, the total population of Turkey is composed of Syrians at around 5%. The patterns of this demography are interesting when examined in detail because the process is subject to a great number of elements affecting each other reflexively. These elements are the geographic and provincial distribution of this 5 percent population, their legal status, their relationships in the national and international networks, their directions of movement, their current socio-cultural characteristics, and the economic conditions they have experienced after 2011. The process in front of us is very delicate in terms of horizontal and vertical social relations and features because of class, culture, economic conditions, international relations, legal procedures, NGO activities, aid and benefits, vulnerability, inequalities, demands for rights, and justice, gender, education status, productivity, and rural and urban qualities co-exist all together in this process and they all are tried to be kept in balance with the dynamics of the society they live in. Moreover, since the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic, a potentially transformative factor, has also been added to this complex process.

For this reason, each about-to-start project and research concerning the Syrians always means to go on an adventure open to the effects of many calculated or incalculable phenomena. As mentioned before, a case in point is a heterogenous around 4 million population—the number of registered people. Another important point is that this phenomenon is vague since it is shaped by the last 10-year long circumstances of being

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> Access: 23.06.2021

migrants and refugees and has been quickly designed itself by the policies of Turkey and foreign countries.

In other words, regardless of the period before or after COVID-19, it is faced with Syrian demography rapidly reconstructing itself and formed by national and international political dynamics in all aspects, such as their status and settlement. Also, considering this Syrian population's distribution among Turkey's provinces and the degree and ways of interaction with the present social structure, it is clear once more that the COVID-19 pandemic has deeply influenced both the Syrians and the locals. For example, considering the Syrians in Gaziantep and their wishes for settlement, staying here, or re-migration (65% of them would like to return to Syria while 40% hope to immigrate into a European country should the opportunity arise), it is obvious that COVID-19 has reshaped the potential for remobilizing although these wishes appear stable.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, it is significant to understand how the behavior patterns of the Syrians and the locals who live together in one city are being affected by the national and international dynamics result from COVID-19.

This survey, conducted in the neighborhoods where both the Syrians and the locals live together, seeks to present the effects of COVID-19 experiences on the households of the two populations in these three provinces by applying a gendered and class approach. Therefore, the results are related to the general household patterns rather than the personal characteristics of the respondents chosen to represent his/her household.

Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis are on the top of the provinces where the number of registered Syrians is high. Since each of these three provinces is a significant representative of the whole Syrian population in Turkey, the general features of this demography in these provinces must be mentioned here.

The directions of movement and migration of the Syrians in Turkey, whose numbers are nearly 4 million, have started from their own countries and continued within Turkey and, in some cases, slowed down in the western countries. It appears this situation is formed by the present dynamics and historical background. It can be argued that at least three historical socio-cultural routes on which the spiral of violence and civil war has re-emerged have defined the locations of the Syrians in Turkey and their migration experiences. The first route is between Raqqa and Şanlıurfa, and now the Syrians in Şanlıurfa and the provinces at the east of Euphrates have arrived these provinces through

<sup>24</sup> Gültekin, M.N., Giritlioğlu, İ., Karadaş, Y., Soyudoğan, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S.T., Doğanoglu, M., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., İncetahtacı, N., (2018) *Gaziantep'teki Suriyeliler: Uyum, Beklentiler ve Zorluklar (Özet Rapor)*, Gaziantep: Gaziantep Üniversitesi Yayınları; Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan, M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S. T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Kaya, M., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Açıkgöz, Ü., Özhazar, İ., (2021) *Gaziantep Monitörü 2020 - Suriyeliler*, Ankara: SABEV Yayınları.

this route. The second route is on Aleppo-Kilis-Gaziantep, and the Syrians in Kilis, Gaziantep, and their neighboring provinces have followed it. The last route is between Idlib and Antakya and includes Idlib, the regions of Aleppo near to the Mediterranean Sea, Latakia, and Tartus. These three routes did not arise after 2011; they were historically in existence but became more visible during the migration and refugee processes while forming the distribution of the Syrian population immigrating into Turkey. Another reality about these historical routes is that, unlike the expectations, they are extremely heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, denomination, and culture. Therefore, these routes witness various qualities, cultures, tensions, connections, and social distances through historical differences. More clearly, although Turkey's academics and public opinion have standardized the "Syrians," this heterogeneity and insurmountable social dichotomies have reactivated themselves later under the migration and refugee circumstances. Because of all these reasons, it must be stated that the current conditions of Syrians in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis have been shaped by both current national and international phenomena such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the historical, geographical, and cultural routes.

Furthermore, it needs to consider the social stratification of the demography in question and their interactions with the conditions of the society they live in. For instance, from the beginning of 2020 to the mid-2020, when the survey's fieldwork was completed, COVID-19 was added to all the factors shaping the pattern of the interactions between the Syrians and the locals. Although the distinction between being the Syrian or the local has had various meanings since the beginning, the sudden addition of unpredictable factors such as the pandemic could restructure all the social relations. Therefore, it should be noted that the first aim of this survey study is to understand and indicate the effects of the COVID-19 process on the Syrians and locals' households on the grounds of women and children.

One of the most problematic arguments related to the Syrians in Turkey is based upon *pure Syrian* identity by skipping class and cultural differences among them. However, this perspective isolating the "Syrians" from the current social reality is wrong since the process is much more complicated and includes many different variables such as the past of immigrants and refugees, their relations in global networks, the procedures about jobs, work, and getting citizenship, socio-cultural differences, ethnic and religious identities, and lately the COVID-19 experiences. Therefore, each survey to be conducted on the Syrians,



immigrants, and refugees and to focus on the current and possible future situations must handle this issue through multi-dimensional samples and versatile questions and methods.

As mentioned in the introduction section of this report, the vast majority of Syrians live in city centers, that's why conducting surveys about urban refugees provides more accurate data concerning the general population.

Research about vulnerable groups of society such as immigrants and refugees like the Syrians in Turkey is inevitably multi-layered in terms of perspective, methods, and questions. It should be emphasized that this survey paid attention to the points just mentioned at the maximum level.

The interviews with CARE International in Turkey starting in the first months of 2021 were concluded through the Technology Transfer Office at Gaziantep University (TARGET). After signing the protocol, the legal permissions were obtained from the local authorities of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis in April 2021. Then, the project team, including officials from CARE International in Turkey, and the researchers from the department of Sociology and the department of Journalism at Gaziantep University completed the discussions about the survey field, scope, questions, and other issues. After that, the training of the students who would take part in the survey study began. Because of the pandemic, the student training based on basic health, security, and hygiene rules was conducted in two online sessions. In this training, the students who would take responsibility in the field were trained about various subjects such as survey questions, protection of personal information and informed consent, effective communication and data collection techniques, and methods of face-to-face interviews, research ethics, code of conduct, safe referrals regarding protection disclosures, and key protection related terms and their definitions.

After completing the training, legal permissions, and other procedures, the interviews began in these three provinces on April 26, 2021. The interviews in the field ended in Gaziantep and Kilis on May 26 and in Şanlıurfa on June 1, 2021. Besides gathering data with questionnaires, to make the collected data more understandable and evaluate it together with the information of neutral observers and fieldworkers, in-depth interviews with the employers of national or international NGOs active in the region and of official institutions or associations were conducted in the three provinces at different times. Due to the pandemic, these interviews were held online. After the approval of the respondent, the interview was recorded, and the transcription of the record was carried out. In the 10 in-depth interviews in total, 12 persons were interviewed. The first was on April 21 and the latest was on June 26, 2021. 5 deep-interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, 3 in Kilis and 2 in Şanlıurfa. Some of the institutions of the officials we have interviewed work with refugees, others work with both locals and refugees. In Gaziantep, we interviewed with the

officials from Kırkayak Kültür, Yeryüzü Doktorları, Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seeker (SGDD-ASAM), Welt Hunger Hilfe (WHH), International Organization for Migration (IOM); Turkish Red Crescent, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and International Blue Crescent (IBC) in Kilis; Concern Worldwide and Turkish Red Crescent in Şanlıurfa.

The gender and nationality distributions of the interviewers taking part in the data gathering process as 10 Turkish and 6 Syrian women and 2 Turkish and 4 Syrian men in Gaziantep; 6 Turkish and 3 Syrian women and 9 Turkish and 5 Syrian men in Şanlıurfa; 8 Turkish and 2 Syrian women and 1 Turkish and 11 Syrian men for Kilis. The total number is 66 students. The students' knowledge of Turkish and Arabic was evaluated. The questions were written in English with the cooperation of CARE International in Turkey. Before they were applied in the field, they were translated into Turkish and Arabic. For all the interviews in the field, *KoBoToolbox* was used. To organize the data and create the charts, *MS Excel*, *R* and *IBM SPSS* were benefited.

While deciding on the sample, the current geographical distribution of the Syrians, statistics, socio-cultural conditions, and sociological reality were considered to choose a balanced sample. Since the density of the registered Syrians is in urban areas in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis, the sample was chosen from the neighborhoods in city centers, and the interviews were conducted there. As known, almost all the registered Syrians in Turkey (98.5%) live in the city centers.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, when the survey sample was chosen (March-April 2021), the population of the registered Syrians in these three provinces was 980 thousand 994 persons. This number divided by 6, the average household size obtained in the previous surveys, equals 163 thousand 499 households. The number of the households/families to be interviewed in each province was calculated by choosing the random sample so that it would represent 99% of the registered Syrians and total population in every province and be with an error margin at 5%. As a result, 785 households per province and 2355 households in total were enough for the aimed accuracy and the representation of the population of interest. Nevertheless, considering the potential risks in the field, 800 responses were planned per province and at the end, 2560 households in total were interviewed.

During selecting the districts and neighborhoods in the city centers, deliberate elimination was applied in some cases. In Kilis, all the neighborhoods of the central district were included in the random sample. In Gaziantep, the neighborhoods in the districts of Sahinbey and Sehitkamil (with some exceptions), which are the center of the metropolitan municipality, were chosen; however, the neighborhoods of Pancarlı, İbrahimli, Güvenevler, Sarıgüllük, Değirmişem, and Batıkent in Şehitkamil were eliminated because it was

<sup>25</sup> <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/> (Access: 19.07.2021)

confirmed in two surveys conducted in 2018 and 2020 that the Syrian population in these neighborhoods was at very low levels. As for Şanlıurfa, all the neighborhoods in the center districts called Haliliye and Eyübiye were included in the sample, whereas the neighborhoods in Karaköprü were excluded. Since this survey chooses the neighborhoods where the Syrians and locals live together, this togetherness is mostly provided in the neighborhoods resided by the low- and middle-income families, the mentioned neighborhoods of Gaziantep and Karaköprü district of Şanlıurfa were eliminated from the random sample. In other words, choosing the neighborhoods composed of the Syrian and local families with low- and middle-income who live together is based on sociological reasons in this survey to indicate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This survey mainly seeks to present the socio-economic conditions of the households of the Syrians and the locals in these three provinces and their interactions during the pandemic. Therefore, during the interviews, it focused on the household patterns, gender relations, and interactions of the household members in this process. The questions were decided to provide results indicating the similar and different aspects of the COVID-19 experiences of both the Syrians and the locals, who happen to be “neighbors” sharing the same physical and social spaces. Therefore, the analyses were also based on the same approach.

**Table 1: Population Size and the Sample of the Survey**

Province	Registered Syrians (by April 2021)	Estimated Households/Families	Sample (Households)		
			Syrians	Locals	Total
<b>Gaziantep</b>	451,962	75,327	418	412	830
<b>Şanlıurfa</b>	424,023	70,671	452	424	876
<b>Kilis</b>	105,009	17,501	430	424	854
<b>Total</b>	<b>980,994</b>	<b>163,499</b>	<b>1,300</b>	<b>1,260</b>	<b>2.560</b>

The results of this survey were gathered through a comprehensive set of questions, including the demographic findings of the Syrians and the locals in each province, women’s status, family and marriage patterns, previous migration experiences, the current legal status, education status, everyday social encounters, information about the vulnerable individuals in the households, daily socio-economic interactions (neighbor relations, etc.), job and work-life, and COVID-19 experiences.

Consequently, this survey does not only help us comprehend the encounters and interactions in the central neighborhoods in metropolitan provinces of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis that host more than one-fourth of the Syrians registered under temporary protection in Turkey but also to understand the patterns having emerged during

a global crisis called the COVID-19 pandemic and raise awareness about the issues such as immigrant, refugee, social cohesion, integration, inclusion, and exclusion, which have been ongoing in Turkey since 2011 and are going to be more seriously discussed from now on.

## Sample Characteristics

In this survey, the target is to set forth the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the households of the Syrians and the locals. During the interviews, the respondents were asked about the household rather than personal information. The daily life interactions were tried to be understood through the questions about the household relations during the pandemic. In that sense, the 2560 surveys were attempted to equally divide the Syrians and the locals, simply, 1280 participants from local community and 1280 participants from Syrian community. With this method, the aims and concerns regarding the revealing class and displacement status differences and similarities were also tried to be achieved. The interviews with the Syrians and the locals being conducted in the same neighborhoods were related to the methodological and sociological concerns, as mentioned before. The clusters of the neighborhoods close to each other make it easier to compare the class features. Unless the survey was conducted with the Syrians and the locals living in same neighborhoods, it would not revealed results providing such accurate data and chances to compare. Leaning on more accurate data about the gender relations and pandemic provides more reliable information about the household patterns of the Syrians and the locals.

Therefore, the current number of conducted surveys and all the patterns concerning the provinces, districts, neighborhoods, gender are sufficient to compare the Syrians and the locals within the boundaries of Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa; and also to compare among these three cities. Of 2560 surveys, the number of them conducted with women is slightly over than men. This arrangement in the sample is deliberate to comprehend the household patterns more precisely.




Chart 1: Distribution of the Respondents' Displacement Status





Chart 2: Distribution of the Respondents among Provinces

Table 2: Distribution of the Respondents according to Gender and Provinces

Province		Respondents		Total
		Female	Male	
Gaziantep	SR	243	175	418
	TR	290	122	412
	<b>Total</b>	<b>533</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>830</b>
Kilis	SR	229	201	430
	TR	258	166	424
	<b>Total</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>854</b>
Şanlıurfa	SR	192	260	452
	TR	195	229	424
	<b>Total</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>876</b>
<b>Total</b>	SR	664	636	1,300
	TR	743	517	1,260
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,407</b>	<b>1,153</b>	<b>2,560</b>





**Chart 3: Distribution of the Respondents' Gender**

**Table 3: Sample Distribution according to Districts**

Districts	Sample
Şahinbey/Gaziantep	626
Şehitkâmil/Gaziantep	204
Merkez/Kilis	854
Eyyubiye/Şanlıurfa	441
Haliliye/Şanlıurfa	435
<b>Total</b>	<b>2560</b>

Slightly more than half of the interviews are with Syrian households. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, and in Charts 1, 2, and 3, the distribution of the respondents in the sample is commensurate with the number of registered Syrians in the provinces and districts. In addition, the number of female respondents is higher than the male respondents because the presence of women at higher numbers is quite important to understand the domestic relations during the COVID-19 process and obtain more accurate and reliable data since it reflects the patriarchal values.

# Findings

## Immigration Process




Chart 4: Year of Migration to Turkey

As expected, the Syrians's answers in the three provinces indicated that the border crossings from Syria were more frequent in the period between 2013 and 2016 and reached the peak in 2014 due to the conflicts intensified, especially in northern Syria. Thus, around 80% of total Syrian immigration took place until 2016, and after that gradually diminished.






Chart 5: For how many years have you been residing in this province?



**Chart 6: Did you move to another province in the last year?**


Considering Graph 5 and Chart 6 together makes the situation more meaningful. These two visuals indicating the Syrian's movements within Turkey suggest a small difference between the Syrians in Gaziantep and Kilis and those in Şanlıurfa in terms of both the year of arriving in Turkey and settling in that given province. Undoubtedly, this difference is intimately related to the war in Syria. The Syrians residing in Gaziantep and Kilis mostly arrived from Aleppo and its regions, while the Syrians in Şanlıurfa are mostly from Raqqa and Al-Hasakah. Since the battles around Aleppo started before the battles around Raqqa, the Syrians around Aleppo began to go to Turkey earlier. The routes mentioned in the section of Survey Field and the Methodology have shown themselves here once more, whereas Gaziantep and Kilis are a part of the Aleppo route, Şanlıurfa follows the Raqqa route. Consequently, the newness and frequency of the movement in Şanlıurfa can be explained through these facts.

## Common Demographic Information



**Chart 7: Age Distribution of the Sample**


The average age range of the respondents representing each household is between 18 and 45. These results prove that local and Syrian households have a young population. However, unlike Turkey's average, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa hold younger demography like the Syrian population, which is not surprising.




**Chart 8: Marital Status**

Almost three fourth of the 2,560 respondents are married. At this point, the difference between the locals and the Syrian is not remarkable. The rates of the divorced and those living apart from their spouses are similar for the locals and the Syrians. As to religious marriages, it is understandable why the number of Syrians with religious marriages are two

and half more than the locals' number because it is known that during the processes of migration and refuge, marriage—as much as having a more crowded household size—becomes one of the most significant coping mechanisms. Lastly, in this survey in which no interview with under the age of 15 was conducted, the rate of the singles is higher for the locals.



**Chart 9: Gender of the Household's Head**



**Chart 10: Age of the Household's Head**

Although most of the respondents were deliberately chosen from women among both the locals and the Syrians, as mentioned before, chart 9 indicates that only a small part of the women respondents sees themselves as the head of their households. The ingrained roots of patriarchy in the households of both the locals and the Syrians show themselves here once more. The head of the households of both groups is mostly a man, which is at almost the same rate (about 90%) for both. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that the most considerable similarity between the locals and the Syrians is this supremacy of patriarchy. On the other hand, the number of female household heads is slightly higher

among the Syrians can be interpreted through the war keeping on since 2011, and it is one (positive) effect on the families (despite all difficulties). Regardless of place and being a refugee, the break within patriarchal family relations and the more frequent presence of women that have a voice in the family can be evaluated as a favorable outcome despite of all the adverse conditions.




Chart 11: How many people live in your household, including you?


Table 4: Average Household Size (Persons)

	SR	TR
Gaziantep	5.88	4.25
Kilis	5.72	3.98
Şanlıurfa	6.08	5.46
General Average	5.90	4.45

Table 5: Age and Gender Distribution of Household Members

Age	SR		TR	
	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)
0-6	12.2	11.5	7.2	6.3
7-17	12.9	12.9	11.5	10.6
18-24	6.6	7.4	8.0	8.8
25-59	16.5	15.9	20.1	19.7
60+	2.1	2.0	3.9	3.9





**Chart 12: Age and Gender Distribution of the Household Members**

When we consider the household size, the results are as expected. The in-depth surveys and statistical calculations concerning the Syrians in Turkey put forward that the average household size of the Syrians is between 5.7 and 6.<sup>26</sup> The data gathered for both the locals and the Syrians in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa has a similar pattern with the TURKSTAT data. According to the report “*İstatistiklerle Aile, 2020*,” published by TURKSTAT on May 6, 2021, the average household size in Turkey is 3.3. However, considering the region-focused data, the average number of persons per household is higher in the east of Turkey compared to the west.<sup>27</sup> As part of the eastern region, the provinces within the scope of this survey have higher average family sizes. According to the data of 2020, the average household size is 4.04 in Gaziantep, 3.52 in Kilis, and 5.25 in Şanlıurfa. Indeed, our survey calculated those averages as 4.25 for Gaziantep, 3.98 for Kilis, and 5.46 for Şanlıurfa. The mean of these three numbers is 4.27 for TURKSTAT compared to 4.45 in our survey. There could be two possible reasons for this difference: Firstly, the survey field in all the three provinces is the neighborhoods where the low-income families live. Secondly, having more household members within one household has become a coping strategy for the locals and the Syrians during the COVID-19 process.

<sup>26</sup> Erdoğan, M. (2020). *Suriyeliler Barometresi 2019 Suriyelilerle Uyum İçinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi*, Ankara: Orion Yayınevi.; Gültekin, M.N., Giritlioğlu, İ., Karadaş, Y., Soyudoğan, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S.T., Doğanoglu, M., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., İncetahtacı, N., (2018) *Gaziantep'teki Suriyeliler: Uyum, Beklentiler ve Zorluklar (Özet Rapor)*, Gaziantep: Gaziantep Üniversitesi Yayınları; Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan, M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S. T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Kaya, M., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Açıkgöz, Ü., Özhazar, İ., (2021) *Gaziantep Monitörü 2020 - Suriyeliler*, Ankara: SABEV Yayınları.

<sup>27</sup> <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Istatistiklerle-Aile-2020-37251> (Access: 25.07.2021)

In other words, the household size is higher in this survey since the obligation to stay together has emerged during the pandemic to decrease the expenses.

Considering the distribution of age groups of the households, the population of the Syrian households is quite young. The age group of 0-24 is higher among the Syrians than the locals, whereas the locals have higher numbers in the group of 25 and older (table 5). The July 2021 data of the Ministry of the Interior also shows that the Syrians have younger demography. According to this data, all the Syrians registered under temporary protection in Turkey are around 3 million 688 thousand. This population comprises Syrians in the age group of 0-24 at 61%.<sup>28</sup> In this survey, this rate for these three provinces is 63.5%. Hence, it is parallel with the official data.




Chart 13: How many persons in your household have Turkish citizenship?




Chart 14: Households with at Least One Person Having Turkish Citizenship (according to provinces)

At least one person has Turkish citizenship in the 13.3% of the households in these three provinces. Holding Turkish citizenship is crucial for social groups like the Syrians

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 20.07.2021)

living under difficult circumstances because it provides access to education, employment, health services, and free travel. The rates of Turkish citizenship, however, vary with each province. The acquisition of Turkish citizenship of the Syrians in Gaziantep follows a gradual pattern from 2017 to 2021. The rate of those who got Turkish citizenship was founded as 3.6% in the survey conducted in 2017 and published in 2018, while this rate increased to 4.9%, according to the survey results conducted in 2020 and published in 2021.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, it can be stated that the increase was constant in these few years.

On the other hand, there is neither official data nor a reliable survey for the previous years about the Turkish citizenship status of the Syrians in Kilis and Şanlıurfa. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss why this rate is three times higher in Şanlıurfa than in Gaziantep. Moreover, even though the Syrians have been under temporary protection in Turkey for ten years, the government has published no clear and transparent procedures about their acquiring Turkish citizenship. As a result, explanations about this situation are lacking.





Chart 15: How many people in your household are employed?

<sup>29</sup> Gültekin, M.N., Giritlioğlu, İ., Karadaş, Y., Soyudoğan, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S.T., Doğanoglu, M., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., İncetahtacı, N., (2018) *Gaziantep'teki Suriyeliler: Uyum, Beklentiler ve Zorluklar (Özet Rapor)*, Gaziantep: Gaziantep Üniversitesi Yayınları; Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan, M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S. T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Kaya, M., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Açıkgöz, Ü., Özhazar, İ., (2021) *Gaziantep Monitörü 2020 - Suriyeliler*, Ankara: SABEV Yayınları.



**Chart 16: Relationship between the household size and the sum of the number of members working for a fee in the same household**


Some features related to the number of employed people are striking. In 17.4% of the locals' households, there is nobody in a job providing income; however, this rate does not mean that this group of the locals does not have any income as this number includes the retired. On the other hand, the rate of those that do not have a paid job is 10.2% for the Syrians in Turkey. Considering this population does not have a chance to get retire in Turkey (as long as they do not have Turkish citizenship) and the survey was conducted in poorer neighborhoods of each province, it could be stated that almost all of this proportion of the Syrians have to strive to live off social and financial assistance. Other data under the title of job and work also points out that more household members must work to afford the family expenses in the Syrian households compared to the locals' households. The rate of households with one employed person is 4% higher in the Syrian households. The rate of the Syrian households with two employed people is 3% higher, whereas it is 1%

higher in the Syrian households in which four people are employed. It means that Syrian households need more than one employed person to maintain their daily lives.

**Table 6: How many People in Your Household are Employed? (by the Gender of the Household Head)**

Number of members working for a fee in the same household	Female Household Head	Male Household Head	No Household Head
<b>No one is working</b>	40.18%	11.00%	23.16%
<b>1</b>	44.20%	66.71%	41.05%
<b>2</b>	13.84%	17.50%	25.26%
<b>3</b>	1.34%	3.79%	7.37%
<b>4</b>	0.45%	0.85%	1.05%
<b>5</b>	0.00%	0.09%	2.11%
<b>6</b>	0.00%	0.05%	0.00%
<b>Column Total</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

When we look at Table 6 results aggregated by the gender of the household head, we observe a disadvantageous situation for households whose head is female. In 40 percent of these households, no one is working. As inline with the comment in the previous paragraph, female-headed households are suffering a structural issue when it comes to working for a fee. This is related to the effects of the traditional gender roles. In traditional familial order, women are responsible for child, elderly care, and household chores. They are expected to stay home and not work. This perception affects women's place in the workplace: Employers are less willing to provide jobs to women. Thus, especially, a woman parenting alone is less likely to find jobs or less like to spares time and opportunities to work for a fee.



**Chart 17: Distribution of the Employed Persons in the Provinces (According to Gender)**

As emphasized before, the patriarchal value system is dominant among the locals and the Syrians. The same situation shows itself in the data about who earns in the household. The lowest rate for women in paid work is in Şanlıurfa (13%), and the highest one is in Kilis (23.6%). There could be many reasons to explain this situation in Kilis, such as the proportion of the Syrian population to the locals, the scarcity of agricultural labor, the limited household size, the household and education patterns of the local population, and the difference in labor supply. However, explaining this distinctive feature in Kilis requires further data.





Chart 18: The Percentage of the Households Having at Least One Individual with Disabilities

Table 7: Distribution of the Individuals with Mental and/or Physical Disabilities

Age	SR (204 people)		TR (131 people)	
	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)
<b>0-17</b>	14.2	19.6	12.2	15.3
<b>18-24</b>	3.4	7.4	3.8	6.1
<b>25-59</b>	9.8	29.4	10.7	23.7
<b>60+</b>	8.3	7.8	13.7	14.5

Chart 18, Chart 19, Chart 20, Table 7, and Table 8 reveal familial results concerning the individuals with disabilities and chronic illnesses in the households.



**Chart 19: The proportion of households having members with disabilities (by the gender of the household head)**

The rate of the Syrian households with at least one person with disabilities is 13.6%, while this rate is 9.7% for the locals' households. Only in Gaziantep, the rate of the Syrian households with disabled people is 23% for 2018. In 2021, this rate was 12.5% for the Syrians in Gaziantep and 6.9% for the locals of Gaziantep.<sup>30</sup> As to the households with disabled people in the whole of Turkey, the average is 6.9%. However, in conjunction with war and violence, the rate of people with disabilities could increase to 20% depending on the region's conditions and social life.<sup>31</sup> Since the civilians have been directly targeted in the countries in war and providing health services there have become harder during and after the war, the rate of individuals with disabilities and chronic illnesses has rapidly

<sup>30</sup> Gültekin, M.N., Giritlioğlu, İ., Karadaş, Y., Soyudoğan, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S.T., Doğanoglu, M., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., İncetahtacı, N., (2018) *Gaziantep'teki Suriyeliler: Uyum, Beklentiler ve Zorluklar (Özet Rapor)*, Gaziantep: Gaziantep Üniversitesi Yayınları; Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan, M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S. T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Kaya, M., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Açıkgöz, Ü., Özhazar, İ., (2021) *Gaziantep Monitörü 2020 - Gaziantep'liler*, Ankara: SABEV Yayınları; Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan, M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S. T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Kaya, M., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Açıkgöz, Ü., Özhazar, İ., (2021) *Gaziantep Monitörü 2020 - Suriyeliler*, Ankara: SABEV Yayınları;

<sup>31</sup> Palmer, M., Mont, D., Nguyen, C. V., Groce, N. E., Mitra, S. (2019) Long-lasting consequences of war on disability, *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(3), pp. 1-16.

climbed regardless of gender and age. In this respect, the higher number for the Syrian population is quite understandable.

As mentioned, the rate of the locals' households with at least one person with disabilities is 9.7% in these three provinces. Considering the average for Turkey (6.9%), the rate of 9.7% for these provinces is also higher than Turkey's average. However, it must be kept in mind that the household size in these three provinces is also larger.<sup>32</sup> However, independent from the household sizes, there are in-group differences when the gender of the household head is used as aggregate. Among women-headed households, the ratio of the households having members with a disability is slightly higher. This results may also be related to post-war conditions and also the vice versa might be true that decisions in the households having men with disabilities might be taken by women who becomes the only responsible person to take care of the family and the household.




Chart 20: The proportion of households having at least one member with chronic illness (by displacement status)

Table 8: Distribution of the Individuals with Chronic Diseases

Age	SR (434 people)		TR (434 people)	
	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)
<b>0-17</b>	4.6	4.1	1.2	2.7
<b>18-24</b>	1.6	2.8	0.7	0.7
<b>25-59</b>	39.9	28.3	30.3	22.6
<b>60+</b>	3.7	15.0	22.1	19.7


<sup>32</sup> [www.aile.gov.tr/media/78170/eyhgm\\_istatistik\\_bulteni\\_nisan\\_2021.pdf](http://www.aile.gov.tr/media/78170/eyhgm_istatistik_bulteni_nisan_2021.pdf) (Access: 26.07.2021)



The data collected reveals that the Syrians in the age group of 0-17 have mental and physical problems at higher rates than the same age group of the locals. The situation to be remembered here is that this generation has experienced all the difficulties of the war in the last ten years, which corresponds to their whole childhood. On the other hand, the rate of persons with mental and physical disorders is higher among the locals in the age group of 60 and above, which could be accepted as an elder group.


Diseases related to heart, high blood pressure, kidneys, and other chronic illnesses are more common among the locals. However, as stated before, the Syrians have a younger population than the locals in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa. Therefore, this higher rate of the locals living with chronic diseases is related to the age difference between the locals and the Syrians. Moreover, following Table 8, the Syrian women between 25-59 have chronic diseases at higher rates than the Syrian men between 25-59. In contrast, these illnesses are more common among the Syrian men above 60 than the Syrian women above 60. As for the locals with chronic diseases, the rate for women is higher than the men except for the age group of 0-17. Furthermore, the highest rates are in the age group of 25-59 for the local women. However, considering that women participate more in domestic chores and childcare, having chronic illnesses in this age group is understandable.

## Education



**Chart 21: Children's Schooling**


The schooling of children of the locals' and Syrian households is at equal rates. Therefore, there is no difference between the locals and the Syrians based on the distribution of having at least one child in school. This situation is because the population is young in both communities, and the household sizes, around or more than 4 on average, are more crowded in these three provinces. Therefore, it is reasonable why there is at least one school-age child in the households.



**Chart 22: Education Status in the Syrian Households (according to the Gender of the Respondents)**

Although the rates of the children going to school are quite similar in the households of the locals and the Syrians, the curve declines among the Syrians as the education level


progresses to higher education. Whereas the Syrian men precede the Syrian women in primary school education, higher education is slightly more for Syrian women.



**Chart 23: Education Status in the Locals' Households (according to gender)**

As to the locals, the curve for women and men is almost the same in primary, secondary, and high schools. However, the rates for higher education decreased by almost half for both sexes.

Another but more remarkable point is that the rate of the Syrians in high school equals one-third of the locals. This situation indicates the Syrians' characteristics related to education and that they must be out of school to afford the expenses of their households rather than continue to stay in school after primary and secondary education.



**Chart 24: Distribution of the Students Who Work While Attending School**

The presence of poor, immigrant, and refugee school-age children who work to financially support their families is a significant worldwide phenomenon. Although the

“normal” is the children dealing only with education and school problems, most of them are obliged to work under hard and unhealthy conditions. It is known that these children face various physical and mental problems in their development by the characteristic of the job they have.<sup>33</sup> In countries like Syria and Turkey, where traditional artisanship is intrinsic in society since mentor systems and technical education have not been completely integrated into the school and formal education system yet, children take place in the labor market under the name of “technical education.” Mentor systems built around traditional relations are another kind of labor market in which most children of the poor participate in. However, children obliged to become out of school and a part of the workplace environment are exposed to many types of abuse, violence, and exploitation.

Since laws of Turkey and international convention signed by Turkey prohibit child labor and accept any information or data regarding this kind of labor as denunciation, direct questions in any survey about the children who are “out of school” or “working” give only inaccurate data. As the immigrant and refugee families are aware of this legislation, it does not seem possible for them to state that there exist children out of school in their households. Thus, this kind of information can be gathered only by asking whether “children are sent to learn a craft.” Consequently, collecting data by questionnaires from refugees whose children are in the labor force is considerably difficult, and the gathered statistics are open to discussion. Since being out of sight is a coping strategy for refugees, the results concerning their children in the labor force must be considered cautiously. Therefore, child labor, defined as “child learning craft” and thus legitimized in these three provinces, needs caution.





Chart 25: How long have the students been working?

<sup>33</sup> Duyar, İ. & Özener, B. (2003) Çocuk İşçiler/Çarpık Gelişen Bedenler, Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi.

The local children who work while attending school are at 1.51% for boys and 0.4% for girls, whereas this rate is too low or near zero among the Syrians. Moreover, Chart 25 indicates that children in question were working even before COVID-19; therefore, it also appears that the COVID-19 pandemic has almost no impact on the status of children at work. Indeed, it is not realistic to expect an increase in this situation when lockdowns during COVID-19 are considered. However, it must be emphasized that recording the correct numbers of children who work through this kind of survey is rather difficult. Therefore, only if small industrial zones, craft shops, and workplaces of shopkeepers were examined through different methodologies, more realistic data be possible.

## Difficulties in Remote Learning



**Chart 26: Distribution of the Students (7-17 Age) Who Could not Continue Their Education via TV/the Internet**

The remote learning system applied during the pandemic has brought many unsurprising problems due to households' socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions. In addition, disadvantaged social groups and poor and crowded households have had to experience various difficulties resulting from the lack and/or inadequacy of technical infrastructure and equipment.

In the households of both the Syrians and the locals, children, regardless of sex, have had problems with remote learning. While 28% of the Syrian girls and boys have had difficulties while keeping on education via TV or the internet, this situation is at 20% for the girls and 30% for the boys of the locals. These rates (Chart 26) put forward that more than one-fourth of the locals' and Syrian households had problems with face-to-face education during the COVID-19 process.

As for the problems and obstacles faced by the school-age children during the COVID-19 process, the results about both the locals and the Syrians are as expected. Lack of equipment providing infrastructure for remote learning such as a solid and reliable internet connection, television, computer, or tablet is the biggest issue in about three-fourths of the households of the locals and the Syrians. However, the girls of both communities suffer more from this lack of equipment. This disadvantaged situation encountered by the girls reveals to us the presence of some other underlying causes, which are related to patriarchal socio-economic and socio-cultural patterns dominating the survey field.

**Table 9: Challenges in Access to Remote Learning Experienced by the Students in the Household**

Can you please describe the challenges your children (7-17 age) in your household experience(d) in the process of remote learning and schooling? (multi-selection)	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Lack of access to television, computers, and/or internet (technological infrastructure)	63.9	59.4	69.4	64.6
Language barrier	40.3	40.9	4.3	6.0
Lack of enough information on remote learning	28.4	28.4	35.7	38.9
Difficulty in paying electricity or internet bills	24.2	21.4	42.7	47.1
Lack of support in remote learning	21.7	21.2	31.6	36.0
Children did not understand the subjects well via remote learning methods.	16.3	19.5	33.5	33.7
Children were unwilling to participate in remote learning processes, and they could not concentrate well.	14.0	16.1	29.9	37.1
Children could not get well-qualified education via remote learning methods.	13.8	14.9	30.8	36.3
Lack of remote learning assistance	9.3	9.1	17.3	20.6
Difficulties with providing a proper learning environment at home (lack of table, chair, room, silence and/or overcrowding, etc.)	7.7	8.9	18.6	17.1
Lack of educational support to be provided for the child at home	5.8	3.6	17.1	14.9
Children had to help with household chores, to not spend time on remote learning (domestic responsibilities).	3.0	2.4	14.7	2.6
Children's psychology and mental wellbeing at home were not suitable for effective learning.	1.6	0.7	3.4	4.9
Children had to support income-generating activities, so they could not spend time for remote learning (child labor).	0.2	1.4	2.7	7.1

Lack of technological infrastructure ranks among the challenges in access to remote learning. The rates for the girls are higher in the households of both the locals and the Syrians. The reason for this situation could be interpreted with patriarchal values. Thanks to urbanization and modernization, girls' education has been supported by all traditional societies at certain levels. However, during some crises like COVID-19, it is observed that all the rights gained by women and girls are sacrificed for the sake of men; in other words,

the patriarchy restores its “factory settings.” More clearly, the androcentric perspective, during crises, disrupts the struggle of women and girls within the household and restructures itself.


The language barrier is the second issue all Syrian students complained about. However, interestingly, the locals complain more than the Syrians about the lack of information on remote learning. One reason could be the Syrians’ unawareness of their educational rights. Similarly, the Syrians (around 20% for both men and women) who complain about support in remote learning is lower than the locals. This situation, too, could be explained through language barriers experienced by the Syrians and their limited awareness of their rights. The locals utter their complaints more than the Syrians in situations of lack of concentration and eagerness to participate in the remote learning process, incapability to comprehend the subjects, and finding traditional education more effective than remote learning. However, this circumstance should not be interpreted as if the Syrians suffered less and did not have any problems with remote learning since the determinant here is whether the Syrians in question are aware of their rights related to these topics or not. Similarly, more frequent complaints of the locals about the lack of infrastructure must also be evaluated in the same way. Still, it is a fact that both the locals and the Syrians have experienced a lack and/or inadequacy of technical equipment at almost the same level.

#### Notes from the Interviews

"(...) Before the pandemic, we were working more to eliminate protection risks. For example, it was carried out to address the needs of a child who was estranged from school. But after the pandemic, we are working on children who have become away from the school. The problems here are related to accessing EBA and the internet since the family cannot afford basic needs. They cannot allocate a financial budget for their children's education. The family is having trouble meeting even their basic needs taking the child from school and placing him in any job."

(KI-1, NGO Employee, Kilis)





**Chart 27: Distribution of the Students Dropping Out of School When Face-to-Face Education Started During COVID-19**

For the first time, Turkey was introduced to COVID-19 pre-cautions and lockdowns, changing from time to time in March 2020. The education system and schools have been mostly affected by these precautions. Central and local institutions started remote learning in a very short time. However, like all the countries, Turkey was also caught unaware. The regulations and prohibitions were not at the same level all the time. Schools turned back face-to-face education when the number of cases was lower than certain limits. However, the final decisions regarding students' attendance were up to parents. Even though schools were open, they could not have the same effectiveness as when classroom learning was normal due to the pandemic and its risks. It is known that during this process, a major part of students did not attend classroom learning. Therefore, both local and Syrian respondents in these three provinces were asked whether the students in their households attended school during the period of face-to-face education. It was found out that 5.5% of the Syrian boys and 4.5% of the local boys never attended classroom learning. Interestingly, the girls who did not attend classroom learning are lower for both the locals and the Syrians.

**Table 10: How was your daughter affected by remote learning compared to face-to-face education during the pandemic?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
My daughter got bored at home, and attending school was better for her socialization.	68.7	66.6	52.3	45.2
My daughter faced challenges with online learning due to connectivity issues, and therefore attending classroom learning was better for her education.	50.4	53.0	45.6	39.7
When schools were reopened, my daughter's interest in school and learning increased.	38.6	39.2	36.9	33.0
My daughter refrained from returning to school because she was afraid of COVID-19.	9.0	8.9	13.7	11.2
My daughter refrained from returning to school because she preferred studying at home.	4.5	4.4	7.6	10.3
My daughter refrained from returning to school because of the quality of education and school facilities.	1.0	2.1	4.1	5.3
My daughter refrained from returning to school because she had started working.	1.0	2.1	0.4	3.4
My daughter refrained from returning to school because she got married.	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2

Regarding the girls' education, the locals and the Syrians agree on some statements at close rates while they hold a different point of view on some statements. For the Syrians, their daughters got bored at home during this process, and the best way for their socialization was classroom learning. Here, it must be reminded that the previous survey's results put forward the Syrian parents felt more relaxed and equal in the environments including school, education, and contact with teachers.<sup>34</sup> The rate of the local men supporting the statement suggesting that their daughter got bored at home and attending school was better for their socialization is 45%, which is the lowest among the four groups. The number of the local men backing their daughters' attendance in classroom learning is far behind the numbers of the Syrian men (68.7%) and Syrian women (66.6%). Since the survey was conducted in the same physical and social environments shared by the locals and the Syrians, this contrast can be explained only with the possessed opportunities.

<sup>34</sup> Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan, M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S. T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Kaya, M., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Açıkgoz, Ü., Özhazar, İ., (2021) *Gaziantep Monitörü 2020 - Suriyeliler*, Ankara: SABEV Yayınları.

Indeed, school and education provide the most accessible way to get rid of the difficulties and integrate into the social system for the refugees.

Considering the size of the Syrian households and the infrastructure problems they have, why they are more in favor of face-to-face education is quite fair. When schools were open, both the local and Syrian girls' interest in education increased at similar rates.

### Notes from the Interviews

"(...) In particular, they are at a disadvantage that is more difficult to detect because they live in the same house and stay together in quarantine. Before the pandemic, when our beneficiaries came directly to our offices, there was a safe area, and it was easier for them to explain in this safe environment. During the pandemic process, people cannot visit our offices, and they cannot easily explain their needs on the phone. Therefore, it becomes harder to determine beneficiaries. It was easier for us to detect them when they came to our offices and talked. It is more difficult for women and children to talk over the phone. LGBT individuals tend to hide more because they do not think families will accept their identity. Like the time they stayed in the same house increased, their families became aware of it, even if they didn't want to, and thus they were exposed to violence. In such cases, COVID-19 had negative effects."

(KI-2, NGO employee, Gaziantep)

On the other hand, it appears that almost 10% of the girls were reluctant to go back to school due to fear of COVID-19, which has had great importance and urgency among the public for two years. Therefore, this statement supports more than 10% for the locals, whereas it is slightly lower than 10% for the Syrians.

Moreover, 1.5% of the Syrian households stated that their daughter would not go back to school since they started working, whereas 0.3% of the Syrian girls got married and thus would not attend school anymore. The rate of the statement putting forward the daughter would not return to school after the end of the pandemic since she started working is at 3.4% for the local men while it is near zero for the local women. The rate of the local respondents stating their daughter would not go back because of marriage is also around naught. Nevertheless, the educational processes of girls require more in-depth surveys.




Chart 28: Do you think there are enough measures taken in schools to mitigate the risks of COVID-19?


Attitudes toward returning to school are defined by the opinions on the adequacy of school measures. Approximately three fourth of the Syrians (74.4%) think the measures taken are enough to prevent the spread of the virus, whereas the locals share the same idea at 31.9%. While only 13% of the Syrians find the measures inadequate, more than half of the locals (51.4%) do not consider the measures are enough. This situation could be one of the reasons for having an unfavorable opinion on school; however, especially the higher number of local male respondents appears to be mainly related to patriarchal values.

**Table 11: What strategies did you adopt to overcome the impacts of COVID-19 on education (particularly remote learning?)**

	SR	TR
Adults in the household supported children in their school subjects	45.6	52.8
We requested support from governmental or non-governmental organizations for remote learning.	29.7	44.7
We bought additional books, CDs, etc., to support children's learning process.	21.5	43.5
We hired a private tutor.	8.2	1.6
We sold valuable household assets in exchange for the education of our children.	6.8	3.9


In remote learning during the COVID-19 process, many setbacks were encountered. According to their socio-economic conditions, the household members looked for various ways to support children's education. The adults striving to help their children is at 45% for the Syrians, while it is at almost 53% for the locals. In terms of demanding and obtaining support from governmental or non-governmental organizations, the rate is around 45% for the locals and about 30% for the Syrians. The gap between these last two rates is considered significant because it indicates that the public's current belief in the Syrians being favored in aid is untrue. However, this result is not a surprise since the other data also underpins this fact. The extra educational materials bought by the locals is twice as high as the Syrians. As to hiring a private tutor, the rate is six times higher for the Syrians. This number could point out that the Syrian households realized that the children were negatively affected by remote learning. Thus they spent an important proportion of their income on tutors. They strived to prevent the children from falling behind in terms of education in which the children are already disadvantaged. Selling assets to support their children's education is twice as common among the Syrians as the locals. As a result, the findings in the last two tables confirm each other. The Syrian households cannot take enough aid from the government or other institutions and sell their assets to compensate

for the problems resulting from remote learning. Thus, the positive attitude of the Syrian households to face-to-face education is at higher rates. Additionally, the locals' households spend more on the additional materials because the language of the materials is Turkish, and their financial conditions are better than the Syrians.




**Chart 29: Did you receive any financial support for remote learning from governmental or non-governmental organizations?**

As just mentioned, the number of locals and the Syrians who got aid for remote learning from governmental or non-governmental organizations is not very high. The rate for the locals is near 22%, whereas it is at 7.5% for the Syrians. Although the rates of getting aid are low for both communities, the number for the locals is almost three times as many as the Syrians. This finding strongly indicates great prejudice in public in terms of the amount of aid provided for and received by the Syrians.



**Chart 30: What kind of aid did you receive?**

As to the types of aid, cash aid, and computer/tablet aid, a considerably basic need for remote learning is more common. While the Syrians got cash aid at 63%, it is almost 19% for the locals. The locals receiving computer/tablet aid is around four times higher than the Syrians. The aid related to the internet connection is at similar rates for both communities, whereas the Syrians got garment aid a little more. Regarding other kinds of aid related to remote learning, the rates are higher for the Syrians.



**Chart 31: Did your children drop out of school?**

Whether the students in the locals' and Syrians' households dropped out of school during the pandemic due to poverty and other deprivations is questioned. Although the picture is slightly more against the Syrians, the overall pattern is quite similar for both communities in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa. Almost 3.5% of the children in both groups stopped attending online lessons, i.e., dropped out of school.

**Table 12: Household Members Got Married During Pandemic**

Syrian Households Members			Local Households Members	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	4.12%	3.85%	1.41%	3.35%
No	92.33%	92.02%	93.73%	90.42%
No answer	3.55%	4.13%	4.86%	6.23%
Column Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Considering the societal conditions of the survey field in which low-income families live, the dropping-outs remind the phenomena of children forced to work or marry. Although ascertaining the presence of both phenomena requires far more in-depth, multi-dimensional, and long-run fieldwork, both the locals and the Syrians in the three provinces

were quite indirectly asked about the child marriages and the children have dropped out of school with the excuse of the pandemic.

### Notes from the Interviews

"(...) the biggest challenge we face with children is the massive increase in child labor during this period. Due to the rise in child labor, we have difficulty reaching our child beneficiaries. Since they were suspended from remote learning, enrolling them again or persuading them to go to school was challenging. Children who go to school and do not also work experience difficulties. Even if there is internet access, they cannot continue their education if the device is insufficient. In addition, it has become challenging to reach health services in this period; some hospitals are having difficulties providing health services due to COVID-19."

(KI-3, NGO Employee, Gaziantep)





Chart 32: Did any of your school-age children (7-17 years old) (in your household) drop out of school due to the pandemic?



**Chart 33: Why did your child(ren) drop out of school ?**

Under the pandemic conditions, at least one boy in the 5.4% of the Syrians' households and at least one girl in the 3.3% of the Syrians' households have left school. The rate of children who abandoned school due to the pandemic is 2.6% for the local boys and 1.9% for the local girls. Therefore, the Syrian children have encountered more with being out of school in the same global and societal health issue. Considering Table 12 is found out that although the locals and the Syrians reside in the same neighborhoods with the same socio-economic qualities, the latter group more frequently faces poverty and deprivations. As to the rates of the reasons for being out of school, of the Syrian children, 41% supported the family by helping with household chores, 30% began working, and 16% were unwilling to attend the online lessons. Of the local children, 17% did housework, 30% got a job, 43% were reluctant to attend. The latest rate here is dramatic. It appears that being away from the school's physical and social environment merging with poverty and deprivations causes the children to feel distant from the school. At this point, it could be commented that the teaching function of schools is not primary any more thanks to developments in technology; instead, the function of social interaction has become more significant.

Apart from these findings, the Syrian children who got married is 2.3% and there is big gender differences between two communities For the locals' households, marriage was



never mentioned as a reason for dropping out of school, but not mentioning it maybe because of the awareness of legal restrictions related to the marriage of children.

Besides, the rates of Syrian students leaving school due to health issues and problems with technical equipment are the same (2.3%). Therefore, both rates of the last two reasons are 4.3% for the local students.


#### Notes from the Interviews

“(...) Children have had serious problems, especially in accessing education, and they have problems in participating in remote learning. There has been a differentiation in their needs. There is a serious increase in child laborers, and it is strange. In other words, it is not strange some expected studies show this. There is an increase in violence cases. There is an increase in the number of cases that apply to us. (...) But there is an increase and problems are accessing psychological support, especially during periods of such restrictions, they may have problems accessing psychological support. They have problems in accessing their livelihoods. There are financial problems experienced by the whole group and groups financially.”

(KI-4, NGO Employee, Şanlıurfa)


## Statements about the Effects of COVID-19 on Education

The statements taken from the field present crucial points about the effects of the pandemic on education. The findings also bear serious consideration for both Syrians and locals. The questions in this section assess the attitudes toward and thoughts on education during pre-pandemic, pandemic, and post-pandemic periods of all the sample, not just the respondents with children at school.




**Chart 34: Compared to face-to-face education, remote learning has decreased the quality of education and learning performance of the female students in my household.**

In terms of the girls' quality of education and learning performance, both communities stated that there happened a decrease. However, the rate is 85% for the Syrians, whereas it is more than 90% for the locals. These rates indicate strong support for this statement among both the locals and the Syrians.




**Chart 35: Compared to face-to-face education, remote learning has decreased the quality of education and learning performance of the male students in my household.**

The same statement was also posed for the boys. Again, 85% of the Syrians and 95% of the locals think there is an absolute decrease for the boys.




**Chart 36: Remote learning has increased the household expense related to electricity consumption, heating costs, and others.**

The rate of the Syrians considering that remote learning caused an increase in the expenses of electricity and heating is at 60% while it is at 90% for the locals for the same issue. The remote learning process forces the adults in the household to rearrange the physical conditions of the house within the bounds, which increases the expenses afforded by schools or other institutions during the normal periods. Considering the current conditions of low-income households, complaints about this situation are reasonable.




**Chart 37: Female students got jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic, so there was no need to continue remote learning.**




**Chart 38: Male students got jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic, so there was no need to continue remote learning.**

The surveys conducted about immigrants, refugees, and the poor put forward the phenomenon of “children forced to work.” Although it was hard during the pandemic because of the lockdowns and curfews, the households’ attitudes were as expected. A complete choice between education and work does not exist in the locals and the Syrians; however, the rates require to approach cautiously. Particularly the rate for the locals’ attitude toward boys who work (around 14%) is noticeable. The far lower number for the Syrians must be resulting from the meaning attributed by the Syrians to education and the opportunities they hold. Comparing the attitude toward boys’ education to the girls’ is more positive for the girls among the locals.




**Chart 39: Female students got married during the COVID-19 pandemic, so there was no need to continue remote learning.**




**Chart 40: Male students got married during the COVID-19 pandemic, so there was no need to continue remote learning.**

Questions about education and forced marriage were also asked. The locals stated there was no need for their girls to keep in school because they got married during the pandemic at a little higher than 9%. This time, the same issue, but for the boys is at around 8% for the locals. As for the Syrians, the rates are at 7% for the girls and 8% for the boys.

These charts also indicate no remarkable difference between the locals and the Syrians regarding basic patriarchal values and perspectives.



**Chart 41: Female students became socially isolated and lacked friendships during the COVID-19 pandemic and remote learning.**



**Chart 42: Male students became socially isolated and lacked friendships during the COVID-19 pandemic and remote learning.**


We know that the process of COVID-19 has had serious negative effects on not only adults but also children, adolescents, and elders, particularly in terms of socialization, interactions, and relationships. The households in the survey field were also asked about how the children were affected. The crowded household sizes, unsatisfying conditions of houses in terms of physical space, scarcity of green fields and gardens, concrete buildings rapidly increasing because of urbanization, poverty, unemployment or a serious amount of financial loss, and health issues have caused both the locals and the Syrians residing in the survey field to experience social distance and lockdowns more traumatically. More than 60% of the Syrians and more than 70% of the locals stated that the girls felt isolated and

lacked friendships in this period. The situation is also not different for the boys as put forward by the Syrians at 63% and the locals at 64%. They are considering that streets, neighborhoods, and schools are the most important socialization environment for the poor; long-term lockdowns and school closures have affected more adversely the children than other age groups. Therefore, these negative influences have somehow reflected on remote learning.

## Access to Health and Information

**Table 13: What should a person do to be protected from COVID-19?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Should wear mask	92.0	92.8	94.1	92.8
Social distancing	63.8	67.6	80.0	82.7
Wash hands often	66.4	73.0	69.8	77.7
Self-isolation / self-quarantine	49.1	36.1	55.6	56.2
Use hand sanitizers	52.4	49.3	49.2	53.6
Use gloves	45.0	46.4	40.2	50.0
Stop sending children to school	4.2	4.2	6.7	7.4
Stop going to work	5.0	4.3	2.9	4.2
None	0.5	1.1	0.4	1.4
I do not know	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.6



**Chart 43: Do you think you have access to enough accurate information regarding COVID-19 preventive measures?**

COVID-19 has placed the concepts of personal hygiene, infectious diseases, masks, physical distance, and viruses into the daily lives of people from all social classes in Turkey and all over the world. Since last year, all people have been informed about the contagion of the virus from all communication channels.

From the field in all three provinces, we see that locals and Syrians are very well informed about COVID-19. Everyone agrees that the mask is the most important and reliable protection method. There is no significant difference between the locals and the

Syrians in terms of being knowledgeable about many measures such as social distance, washing hands, use of hand sanitizers and gloves, personal isolation, and quarantine.

**Table 14: Where did you get information about the ways to protect against COVID-19?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
TV	63.5	57.5	92.8	88.8
Friends/relatives/neighbours/acquaintances	61.6	65.3	39.2	51.9
Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)	52.0	71.2	37.3	50.8
Local NGOs (NGO workers, booklets, information sessions, etc.)	9.5	16.7	6.4	13.3
International NGOs (NGO workers, booklets, information sessions, etc.)	3.5	5.5	1.7	4.0
Websites	28.7	29.6	33.2	38.3
Government officials	3.5	4.9	9.3	17.3
Community leaders (like muhtar)	0.6	1.2	1.9	2.9
Religious leader	0.2	1.8	1.0	1.9
Teachers	5.0	4.3	4.5	5.1
Newspaper	0.2	1.2	2.8	5.3
Radio	0.2	0.6	2.6	2.9
Poster/billboard	1.9	3.9	6.4	7.7
Health care worker (hospital/clinic)	5.0	6.7	15.8	20.7

There are undoubtedly many reasons and methods for such successful information. The respondents in all three provinces were asked where they had access to information about COVID-19. Television remains the locals' most prominent source of information. About 93% of the local women and around 89% of the local men stated that they were informed about COVID-19 through television. Similarly, many Syrian women (63.5%) and men (57.5%) follow COVID-19 news on television. The language barrier underlies this difference in watching TV. The number of Syrians who learn about COVID-19 from friends/acquaintances is higher (65% for men, 61% for women) than the locals. The rate of locals acquiring information about COVID-19 from acquaintances such as relatives and neighbors is 52% for men and 39% for women.

Similarly, while the locals show a television-dominated pattern in acquiring information or news, the Syrians show a feature in which social media, relatives, and acquaintances are also prominent besides TV. Following the COVID-19 developments from websites is

higher in the male locals. Information from official institutions is below 5% for the Syrians, below 10% for the local women, and below 20% for the local men. The effects of other communication channels seem to be negligible. Undoubtedly, one of the biggest reasons for this is the long-term curfews and total closure.

These results also show that Syrians, due to their objective conditions, use social media and ways of interaction between refugees more intensively to obtain information. On the other hand, the dominance of television continues among the locals. Both the locals and the Syrians seem to be primarily deprived of information from official institutions. Another noteworthy point is that teachers provided information about COVID-19 for both groups, especially for the children, even though there is no face-to-face education. Therefore, regardless of face-to-face or remote, school, education, and teachers play vital roles in the lives of refugees, the poor, and children.

**Table 15: Do you think COVID-19 has disrupted the care of individuals in need in your community? (according to Nationality)**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Their care was disrupted.	31.31%	31.19%	59.93%	60.76%
Nothing changed in their	63.55%	64.85%	36.03%	33.54%
Their care became better.	5.14%	3.96%	4.04%	5.70%


**Table 16: Do you think COVID-19 has disrupted the care of individuals in need in your community? (according to provinces)**

	Gaziantep	Kilis	Şanlıurfa
Their care was disrupted.	47.0	44.1	47.4
Nothing changed in their care.	48.9	51.1	47.8
Their care became better.	4.1	4.8	4.8


The respondents were also asked about the disruptions regarding the care or treatment of people in need. Once more, we encounter some differences between the Syrians and the locals in these questions. Nearly one-third of the locals say the COVID-19 process has interrupted access to the services for those in need of care or assistance, whereas 31% of the Syrians state so. While more than 60% of the Syrians say that there is no change in people's care and assistance, it is around 35% for the locals. This result also means that the Syrians are mainly unable to benefit from these services anyway. However, the locals and the Syrians stating that there was an improvement in care are at equal proportions (around 5%) in all three provinces. When we consider these results on a provincial basis,



we see a negative trend in people in need of help and care, with equal rates (around 47%) in Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa, a slightly lower rate (44%) in Kilis.



**Chart 44: Do you know anyone in your community, except your family, whose test for COVID-19 has come out positive?**



**Chart 45: Did this/these person(s) have access to treatment/medical support?**

In the three provinces, both the locals and the Syrians were asked whether they knew anyone in their community (excluding their families/households) whose test for COVID-19 came out positive. About 30% of the Syrian respondents living in Kilis and Gaziantep said that their acquaintances had a positive result, while this rate is 58% in Şanlıurfa. Around 80% of the locals in Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep stated that the test results of their acquaintances or relatives in the neighborhood were positive. This rate is about 67% in Kilis.

Although both communities physically live in the same places, there is a great social distance between the locals and the Syrians. Under normal circumstances, when “someone you know” is mentioned, it is expected that the Syrians would also utter people of the locals. However, it appears that being familiar with someone is limited only to their

community because of social distance. Therefore, the low rates for the Syrians in the case of knowing someone with positive test results could be resulting from this fact. Another important aspect is the refugees becoming invisible in times of social crisis. In an environment where curfews and normal daily life activities are already at a level of almost zero, it is easier to understand why this rate of the Syrians, whose relatives and acquaintances are not so many in their province, is low. However, it should be remembered that staying invisible is the most frequently used survival strategy of the Syrians in Turkey because if they often participated in the neighbor relations and did not fade into the woodwork, they could face racist grudges and anti-refugee hate speeches more.

More than 90% of these acquaintances, neighbors, or relatives with positive test results received treatment. Only in Şanlıurfa, the locals state at a lower rate (87%), whereas the Syrians were more visible in getting treatment.




Chart 46: The Proportion of the respondents who know anyone in their family whose test for COVID-19 has come out positive?

Table 17: Do you know anyone in your family whose test for COVID-19 has come out positive? (by the gender of the household head, Syrian community)


	Kilis			Gaziantep			Şanlıurfa		
	Female Head	Male Head	No Head	Female Head	Male Head	No Head	Female Head	Male Head	No Head
Yes	7.8%	11.7%	9.1%	17.4%	14.3%	33.3%	33.3%	29.6%	46.2%
No	92.2%	87.7%	90.9%	82.6%	84.9%	66.7%	63.0%	67.5%	53.8%
No answer	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%	3.7%	2.9%	0.0%

**Table 18: Do you know anyone in your family whose test for COVID-19 has come out positive? (by the gender of the household head, host community)**


	Kilis			Gaziantep			Şanlıurfa		
	Female Head	Male Head	No Head	Female Head	Male Head	No Head	Female Head	Male Head	No Head
<b>Yes</b>	29.63%	33.15%	18.18%	40.63%	32.77%	16.00%	37.50%	47.59%	38.24%
<b>No</b>	64.81%	64.61%	72.73%	59.38%	63.84%	84.00%	62.50%	48.13%	61.76%
<b>No answer</b>	5.56%	2.25%	9.09%	0.00%	3.39%	0.00%	0.00%	4.28%	0.00%

Regarding the family/household members with a positive test result, at least one person was identified as positive among 12%, 15%, and 31% in Kilis, Gaziantep, and Şanlıurfa, respectively. While these rates are at 33.5% for the locals in Kilis and Gaziantep, like the pattern of the Syrians in Şanlıurfa, it is 48% for the locals. In addition to the fact that the number of cases in Şanlıurfa is high, it is possible to say that both the locals and the Syrians in Şanlıurfa are more visible than the other two provinces because almost all the Syrians (98%) in Şanlıurfa applied for and could obtain treatment. The rates of getting treatment for the Syrians are 94% in Kilis and 92% in Gaziantep.

Interestingly, while the Syrians in Şanlıurfa seek treatment at the highest rates, the locals who seek treatment in the same province are lowest among the three provinces. When the results were breakdown into gendered groups, every member in Syrian woman-headed households accessed the treatment.



**Chart 47: Did this/these person(s) have access to treatment/medical support?**



**Chart 48: Did this/these person(s) have access to treatment/medical support? (by gender of the household and displacement status)**

**Table 19: If required, would it be possible for you to take a PCR test and treatment?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Yes	80.4	81.0	73.7	79.7
No	6.1	8.4	8.0	6.8
I do not know	13.5	10.6	18.3	13.6

As mentioned before, the flow of information about and awareness of COVID-19 has also led to global mass communication that is rapidly developing and entrenched. Therefore, 80% of the Syrians and 80% of the locals in all three provinces stated that they could take the test when needed. There is a small gender-based difference for the Syrians; however, 74% of the local women stated they could take these tests, whereas 18% do not know about this issue.





Chart 49: If required, where are a PCR test and treatment for COVID-19 available?

Table 20: If required, where are a PCR test and treatment for COVID-19 available? (by the gender of the household head)

	SR			TR		
	Male Head	Female Head	No head	Male Head	Female Head	No Head
Public hospital or clinic	873	81	21	749	71	31
Private hospital or clinic	24	1	2	25	3	7
Family health center	7	0	0	15	1	1
Migrant health center	5	2	0	0	0	0
Do not know	1	0	0	2	1	1
Other	2	1	0	2	0	0

As to being aware of the places where these tests can be done, the rates for both the locals and the Syrians are very close. The only rate that could be meant here is that private

hospitals and clinics were slightly more mentioned by the locals. However, over 90% of both groups stated that these tests could be done in public hospitals or clinics.




**Chart 50: Why do you refuse to take a test/treatment for COVID-19?**

There is also very intense counterpropaganda against the COVID-19 test and subsequent treatments and even vaccines in public and especially in social media. Inevitably, these discussions affect the sample, either positively or negatively. Therefore, the respondents in all three provinces were also asked about their negative attitude toward PCR tests and the treatment. A serious number of locals and the Syrians do not want tests or treatments since they find it more dangerous to go to hospitals during the pandemic. However, almost half of the locals (49%) state that they do not go for testing or treatment in hospitals due to lack of financial resources, while this rate is 20% for Syrians. A significant number (around 18%) of Syrians avoid taking a test or treatment for fear of being deported and stigmatized. Additionally, 9% of Syrians are concerned that it could be used against them in an asylum if they accepted the test and it turned out positive.


**Table 21: When a vaccine for COVID-19 becomes available, will you get vaccinated?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Yes, I would/will.	40.3	53.2	53.9	50.5
No.	40.2	34.9	21.7	25.2
I do not know.	18.2	10.6	13.7	7.0
Yes, I already got vaccinated.	1.4	1.3	10.8	17.3

At the time of the implementation of the survey, toward the middle of 2021, only less than half of the Syrian women stated that they would get vaccinated if they could. On the other hand, half of the local and Syrian men have a positive attitude toward vaccination. Interestingly, 40% of the Syrian women and 35% of the Syrian men said they would not get vaccinated even if they could. The “no” rates are lower for the locals than for the Syrians.



**Chart 51: If you do not choose to get vaccinated, why ? (by displacement status)**




**Chart 52: If you do not choose to get vaccinated, why? (by gender of the respondent and displacement status)**

45% of the Syrians and 47% of the locals, who have a negative attitude to the vaccination, are afraid of the vaccine's side effects. Almost a third of the locals and the Syrians refuse to get vaccinated because they think there is no clear information on whether the vaccine is effective. Female participants are much more concerned with the side effects than male participants.

**Table 22: Has there been any change in the frequency of your visits for health checks or treatment since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic?**


	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
No, it is the same	50.6	48.1	43.5	55.9
Yes, there is a decrease in my health controls/examinations	19.0	17.3	36.5	27.6
No, I did not access services before the pandemic, and I still do	10.6	8.4	2.3	2.2
Yes, there is an increase in my health controls/examinations	7.3	11.3	4.8	4.2
I do not know	5.7	5.0	0.7	0.8
Yes, even though I need to get a health examination, I have never done it since the start of COVID-19	3.5	3.1	11.2	8.0
No answer	3.4	6.8	1.0	1.2

The rates of those who say that since the outbreak of COVID-19, the frequency of their visits for health services have remained in the same way are close to 50% for both women and men of the two groups. However, nearly 50% of the respondents in the total state that their routine health checks or treatments are disrupted.




**Chart 53: What is the reason for not seeking healthcare as frequently as before or not being able to go at all? (by displacement status)**





**Chart 54: What is the reason for not seeking healthcare as frequently as before or not being able to go at all? (by gender)**




**Chart 55: What is the reason for not seeking healthcare as frequently as before or not being able to go at all? (by marital status of female respondents)**

The reasons for not receiving routine health services were also asked. Interestingly, the risk of infecting someone else with COVID-19 is higher among more than half of the Syrians than the locals (21%). While the fear of catching COVID-19 from someone else is around 70% for the locals, this rate is 40% for the Syrians. Both groups have difficulties in affording to go to the hospital. However, while the rate for the locals putting forward the unavailability of hospitals/doctors is around 30%, this rate is 9% for the Syrians.


When we look at the figure of reasons aggregated by gender, women are more concerned than man about getting the disease in health care facilities. The concern of spreading the disease on the other hand comes second for both genders, however, males are more cautious. Among women with different marital status, married women more afraid of getting the COVID-19 from the facilities.

**Table 23: Were you/another member of your household able to get medical assistance when getting sick or injured during the COVID-19 process?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
I needed medical assistance and was able to get it.	23.2	28.9	15.0	10.3
I did not need medical assistance during this time.	66.5	60.8	76.3	80.9
I needed medical assistance but could not obtain it.	10.2	10.3	8.6	8.9




**Chart 56: Were you/another member of your household able to get medical assistance when getting sick or injured during the COVID-19 process ?(by marital status)**




**Chart 57: Were you/another member of your household able to get medical assistance when getting sick or injured during the COVID-19 process? (by the gender of the household head)**


Among Syrians, the rate of those who say that they or their households that needed medical assistance can access the hospital during the pandemic is between 23 and 30% in women and men. The exact rate is between 10% and 15% for locals. However, 76 and 81 percent of the locals said they did not have such needs during the pandemic, while 61 and 67 percent of the Syrians said they did not. Around 10% of Syrians and around 9% of locals stated that they could not access health services during the pandemic, even though they needed it. There are no significant differences among groups based on the gender of the household head and marital status of women.



**Chart 58: Why could you not get medical assistance? (by displacement status)**



**Chart 59: Why could you not get medical assistance? (by gender of the respondent)**



**Chart 60: Why could you not get medical assistance? (by marital status of female respondents)**

The reasons for not being able to access the services they need during the pandemic include appointments that are scheduled for (locals 24%, Syrians 22%), healthcare professionals giving priority to COVID-19 patients in hospitals and clinics (locals 24%, Syrians 21%), closure of nearest health centers which they can get these services (locals, 3%, Syrians 14%, healthcare providers rejecting them (around 10% for both groups), lack of rooms in the hospitals they applied to (17% locals, Syrians 9%), and not being able to


afford treatment costs (13% locals, around 6% Syrians). For women respondents there exists differences between the group of married women and the group of single, widow, separated and divorced women.

**Table 24: Has your access to family planning, counseling, or sexual and reproductive health services such as support for sexually transmitted diseases changed since the outbreak of COVID-19?**


	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Same. Not changed	33.6	40.5	43.4	42.3
I did not obtain services before the pandemic, and I still do not.	20.2	12.2	16.0	14.3
No answer.	19.3	18.8	14.7	15.7
Yes, I have gone more often since the COVID-19 pandemic	15.4	17.2	12.1	9.7
I do not know.	6.6	7.8	8.7	14.5
Yes, I have gone less often since the COVID-19 pandemic began.	2.4	1.3	1.1	0.6
Yes, I used to obtain them, but I cannot since the COVID-19 pandemic began.	2.4	2.1	4.0	2.8

In the interviews in all three provinces, they were also asked about changes in the services they applied for or received regarding sexual health compared to the pre-pandemic period. More than 40% of local women and men say that there is no change in getting or applying for these services, while 34% of Syrian women and more than 40% of men say these services remain the same. Interestingly, 22% of Syrian women and 16% of locals state that they had not applied to these services before the pandemic, so nothing affected them. Between 10% and 17%, we see that both locals and Syrians began to demand these services after the pandemic. While around 2% of the population of both


groups state that they require these services less than ever, the rate of those who say they need these services but cannot reach them due to the pandemic is less than 4%.



**Chart 61: Before the pandemic, which institution you primarily consult for family planning? (by displacement status)**




**Chart 62: Before the pandemic, which institution you primarily consult for family planning? (by the gender of the household head)**




**Chart 63: Since the outbreak of COVID-19, which institution you primarily consult for family planning? (by displacement status)**

Even after the pandemic started, we see that public institutions dominate for both groups' health services, including birth control, family planning, and reproductive health. Interestingly, while the rate of pharmacies in the first step was around 3% for both segments before the pandemic, it increased to 13% after the pandemic. After all, it is an understandable result that the lack of easy access to hospitals or the fear of COVID-19 directs people to the closest and less risky pharmacies. However, seeing that Syrians used 5% of the health services provided by their communities before, but this increased to 13% after the pandemic can be considered a reflection of returning to the group or small community for the households.



**Chart 64: Has your access to antenatal/ post-natal care, safe delivery etc., changed since the COVID-19 pandemic started? (only women)**





**Chart 65: Has your access to antenatal/ post-natal care, safe delivery etc., changed since the COVID-19 pandemic started? (by women's settled province)**

Women were also asked if their access to postpartum services had not changed since the pandemic began. 45% of Syrian women and 35% of locals declare that there has been no change in these services, and they continue to receive the same services. while 34% of local to 27% of Syrian women state that they have not received such services from these organizations before. What is striking here is the change in the frequency of access for some groups. Around 19% of Syrian women say that they go to these services less frequently than before the pandemic, but 20% of local women stated that they go to health institutions after pandemic for prenatal or postnatal care and between 3% and 6% of women say they want to receive these services but cannot access them due to the pandemic. As a result, around %30 percent of women have no access for prenatal/postnatal care even before the pandemic and still cannot access; and the pandemic made it worse for the women from Syrian community and women living in Şanlıurfa.

**Table 25: Before the pandemic, what was your primary source of information for family planning?**


	SR	TR
Government/Ministry Health clinics/hospitals	60.7	72.6
Internet/social media	12.3	8.8
Friends/Relatives/Neighbors/Acquaintances	8.0	7.7
I do not have access to information.	7.4	5.4
Women's groups	6.0	2.2
Private clinics	3.8	2.5
NGO clinics	1.4	0.3
Community outreach workers	0.5	0.5

**Table 26: Since the outbreak of COVID-19, what is your primary source of information for family planning?**


	SR	TR
Government/Ministry Health clinics/hospitals	53.3	64.8
Internet/social media	16.9	12.6
Friends/Relatives/Neighbors/Acquaintances	9.1	5.9
Women's groups	7.1	3.5
I do not have access to information.	6.6	9.1
Private clinics	4.8	3.2
NGO clinics	1.8	0.3
Community outreach workers	0.3	0.7

Before the pandemic, public institutions were mainly consulted regarding family planning (61% for Syrians, around 73% for locals); this rate dropped to 53% for Syrians and 65% for locals after the pandemic. However, when access to these organizations becomes a problem due to the pandemic, we see that the rates of obtaining information from the internet and close friends groups stand out for both groups.


## Protection



**Chart 66: Since the outbreak of COVID-19, have you faced new or different challenges with access to civil documentation, e.g., marriage certificates, birth certificates, temporary protection ID, residence permit, work permits? (only Syrians, by gender of the respondents)**



**Chart 67: If yes, with which type of documentation? Select all that apply. (only Syrians by gender of the participant)**




**Chart 68: What kind of issues did you face? (only Syrians)**

21% of the Syrians under temporary protection state difficulties obtaining the necessary official documents after the pandemic and men are having more difficult times acquiring the all types of documents.. While 58% of women and 62% of men faced difficulties in obtaining TPID, it is stated that there are different problems in terms of residence permits, birth and marriage certificates, and work permits. However, Syrian women and men


express different opinions as to the main reasons for the emergence of these problems, the topics such as increased time to access services, travel restrictions, language barriers, closures due to COVID-19, the low number of employees in government offices, and their inability to keep up with the demand, lack of information, exclusion, and discrimination.

**Table 27: What kind of issues did you face? (by Syrian women's marital status)**

	Single	Legally Married	Marriage not recognized legally	Divorced	Lost Husband
Time to access the services increased due to limited number of working days and hours	13.64%	24.66%	6.67%	20.00%	6.67%
Unable to travel due to movement restrictions	27.27%	15.75%	13.33%	30.00%	26.67%
Language barriers	22.73%	11.64%	0.00%	10.00%	13.33%
The service is no longer available/functioning due to COVID-19	4.55%	14.38%	13.33%	10.00%	0.00%
Time to access the services increased due to limited number of staff serving	9.09%	12.33%	13.33%	0.00%	6.67%
Transportation issues	9.09%	6.85%	13.33%	10.00%	20.00%
Lack of knowledge and information	0.00%	4.79%	26.67%	10.00%	13.33%
Exclusion and discrimination	13.64%	4.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
The service was not available even before COVID-19	0.00%	2.74%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%
Other	0.00%	2.74%	13.33%	0.00%	13.33%



**Chart 69: Who became more vulnerable during the COVID-19 process? (multiselection, five options at most; only Syrians)**




**Chart 70: Who became more vulnerable during the COVID-19 process? (multiselection, five options at most; only locals)**

The Syrian respondents were asked which household members the pandemic affected the most. There are also similarities and differences between Syrians and locals in this regard. According to Syrians, the pandemic mostly affected the elderly (around 50%), households headed by elderly men or women, adolescents, refugees, and other vulnerable groups. According to the locals, the pandemic also affected the elderly in the household (around 65% on average). As might be expected, the main reason for the difference in the rates of the elderly being affected between the Syrian and local populations is that the percentages of age groups differ between the two demographics, and the rate of the elderly population for locals in all three provinces is higher than that of the Syrians.


Subsequently, around 18% of Syrians, 36% of locals, and 30% of men believe that the pandemic has made these households more vulnerable. These ratios need to be read and understood, keeping in mind that women are part of the household and heavy duties and responsibilities such as caring for the elderly and children, kitchen, and cleaning.



**Chart 71: Do you think the level of abuse experienced by the groups you mentioned has changed because of the COVID-19 process?**



**Chart 72: If yes, what types of abuse have increased for these groups? (multi-selection; only Syrians)**



**Chart 73: If yes, what types of abuse have increased for these groups? (multi-selection; only locals)**



A significant proportion of Syrians and locals say that the pandemic has caused some distress and difficulties in their households. For example, 56% of Syrian women see economic violence, 25% see child labor or work, and 24% see emotional violence and neglect of children as the main negative repercussions. Subsequently, Syrians tried to explain many situations such as child abuse, marginalization, and exclusion in connection with the pandemic. Despite the differences, Syrian men also share similar views with women.

Locals state that the most common problem in households due to the pandemic is economic violence or poverty. But, just like Syrians, they think that many problems such as abuse, forced marriage, child labor, and the danger of rape inside and outside the household have emerged. As just mentioned, it should be especially noted that understanding these problems requires multidimensional research.


The respondents were asked about the risk of violence and abuse against women during the pandemic. While a quarter of Syrian men and a third of women say that the risk of abuse and violence has increased, 42.5% of Syrian men and 40% of women say that this has not changed. However, the more interesting result is that one-third of the respondents stated that they have no awareness of violence and abuse. On the other hand, according to the locals, 41% of men and 56% of women said violence and abuse had increased. The increased risk of violence and abuse in the local household pattern is striking.

According to both groups, some reasons increase the risk of this violence and abuse. We see that the conflicts between husband and wife take the lead in nearly 90% of households. In domestic households, 47% of women stated that women do not have freedom of movement, while men agree with this view with 38%. Interestingly, Syrian women agree with this at 18%, while men agree more.


For both groups, the lack of freedom of movement for women and the lack of places to go outside the home during the pandemic play a role in increasing the risk of this violence and abuse.

Although not very significant, around 2% of Syrian and local household members stated that violence and abuse against women decreased during the pandemic. The exact reasons for decreasing can be read in Chart 78 and Chart 79. However, it is remarkable that both locals and Syrians (especially men) who say that violence and abuse against

women have decreased claim that violence against women has decreased due to their inability to go out or go to work during the pandemic period.



**Chart 74: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against women in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only Syrians)**



**Chart 75: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against women in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only locals)**







Chart 76: If you think it has increased, why? (only Syrians)


Chart 77: If you think it has increased, why? (only locals)




**Chart 78: If you think it has decreased, why? (only Syrians)**




**Chart 79: If you think it has decreased, why? (only locals)**




**Chart 80: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against girls in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only Syrians)**




**Chart 81: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against girls in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only locals)**



**Chart 82: If you think it has increased, why? (only Syrians)**



**Chart 83: If you think it has increased, why? (only locals)**



**Chart 84: If you think it has decreased, why?  
(only Syrians)**


**Chart 85: If you think it has decreased, why?  
(only locals)**

At this point, it is necessary to emphasize that the choices "Not changed" and "increased" are extremely important when interpreting and 'reading' this question, covering both the pandemic and regular periods. However, the phenomenon of abuse and violence hidden in these answers may also be buried in the choices "No answer" and "I do not know." Therefore, while interpreting the charts related to this, it would be beneficial for the readers to evaluate all the options in connection to each other. Another issue is that it is not easy for women, children, refugees, migrants, and other vulnerable people to report their negative experiences to such questionnaires. However, these results are sufficient to reveal a pattern.

About one-third of both Syrians and locals do not know or answer the question about the abuse of girls during the pandemic. While about 17% of Syrian women and men talk about an increase, around 47% state no change. Interestingly, 4% of Syrian men say that abuse against girls has decreased, while this rate is 1% for women. Local people have a higher rate of increased abuse. More than one-third of local women say abuses against girls are on the rising.


Regarding why abuses are increasing; Three-quarters of Syrian men and more than two-thirds of women reported that girls are forced to do more housework; 45% of boys talked about forced marriages of girls, and close to one-third of them mentioned girls spending a lot of time on the street because they do not go to school. However, it is noteworthy that Syrian and local women equally (5%) show the forced prostitution of girls as one of the increasing causes of violence. In contrast, men rarely mention this issue/reason. Again, strikingly, 40% of both Syrian and local women cite forced marriage of girls as the cause of violence. This result also points to the everyday problems of both groups living in similar socio-cultural neighborhoods. In this regard, the closure of schools is among the reasons why girls are subjected to violence by both

Syrians and locals. In other words, the schooling of children, especially girls, saves them from early marriages and domestic violence




**Chart 86: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against men in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only Syrians)**

**Chart 87: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against men in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only locals)**



**Chart 88: If you think it has increased, why? (only Syrians)**

**Chart 89: If you think it has increased, why? (only locals)**




**Chart 90: If you think it has decreased, why?  
(only Syrians)**

**Chart 91: If you think it has decreased, why?  
(only locals)**


When we ask whether there is violence against men, 16% of the local men and 14% of the women interviewed stated that there has been an increase in violence. Similarly, 17% for Syrian men and 16% for Syrian women. However, nearly half of Syrians and locals state that there is no change in violence against men. The reason for the increase in violence against men for Syrian survey participants is the lack of rehabilitation programs for men (around 9%), high crime rates in the residential neighborhoods (around 36%), and the fact that men are forced to work in conditions of exploitation and violence (more than 70% on average). At the same time, this determination points to a very important source of labor exploitation. Locals living in the same neighborhoods, on the other hand, stated that the reasons for the increase in violence against men are the absence of studies involving men (around 18%, on average), the fact that they are forced to work in unsafe




places that are open to exploitation and abuse (around 52%), and the high crime rates in the neighborhoods, and security issues (around 54%).




**Chart 92: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against boys in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only Syrians)**




**Chart 93: Do you think the level of violence and abuse against boys in your community has changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only locals)**




**Chart 94: If you think it has increased, why?  
(only Syrians)**



**Chart 95: If you think it has increased, why?  
(only locals)**



**Chart 96: If you think it has decreased, why?  
(only Syrians)**



**Chart 97: If you think it has decreased, why?  
(only locals)**


When asked about violence and abuse against boys, both Syrians and locals have a similar answer: "I do not know." About one-third of the group (regardless of gender differences) avoid expressing opinions on this issue. On the other hand, both groups say no change (around 50% on average) at close rates. The highest increase in violence and abuse against boys is Syrian

men (17%). The rate is also in the 10-15% band for local men and women. Therefore, it seems possible to talk about a noticeable increase in abuse and violence (as in women, girls, and men).


There are different opinions about why abuse and violence are increasing. Half of the Syrian men and women and around 60% of locals cite boys being forced to work as the top reason. While Syrians consider forcing boys to do domestic work as an important cause of violence and abuse (52% of men, 42% of women), this reason drops to 30% among locals.

Both Syrians and locals see boys dropping out of school and on the streets as a major cause of abuse and violence (over 50%). But one of the interesting and tragic reasons is that a quarter of Syrian women and men see the forced begging of boys on the streets as the most significant cause of abuse and violence. This rate is around 6% for local women and 11% for men. Likewise, while 3% of Syrians consider the forced marriage of boys to be a cause of violence, this rate is around 6% for local women and 12% for men.

It is necessary to consider this violence and abuse against women, children, and vulnerable groups not only as a cause that the COVID-19 process has triggered but as an ongoing reality triggered and negatively increased by the pandemic.



**Chart 98: Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which of the following coping mechanisms has your community been adopting? (only Syrians)**



**Chart 99: Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which of the following coping mechanisms has your community been adopting? (only locals)**

**Table 28: Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which of the following coping mechanisms has your community been adopting? (by marital status of local female respondents)**

	Single	Legally Married	Marriage not recognized legally	Divorced	Lost Husband	Separated
Getting into debt with relatives/friends	10.00%	11.68%	10.10%	7.46%	9.09%	16.67%
Getting into debt with shopkeepers/pharmacy	9.00%	11.68%	10.10%	4.48%	8.68%	8.33%
Relying on less preferred and less expensive foods	9.00%	9.01%	7.07%	11.94%	9.50%	12.50%
Spending savings	11.25%	10.45%	11.11%	7.46%	9.92%	4.17%
Delaying payment of loans, bills, and rents	9.50%	12.65%	13.13%	13.43%	10.74%	12.50%
Limiting portion size at mealtimes	5.50%	4.61%	6.06%	4.48%	6.20%	8.33%
Borrowing food, or rely on help from friend or relative	8.75%	8.25%	9.09%	11.94%	7.85%	12.50%
Reducing the number of meals eaten in a day	5.50%	4.57%	7.07%	5.97%	4.96%	8.33%
Sending girls (under 18 yr.o.) to work	2.50%	2.88%	2.02%	2.99%	3.31%	0.00%
Restricting food consumption of adults for children to eat	4.00%	3.81%	3.03%	1.49%	2.89%	4.17%
Getting girls (under 18 yr.o.) married	3.25%	1.48%	0.00%	2.99%	1.65%	0.00%
Selling household/individual assets	3.25%	2.62%	6.06%	4.48%	4.13%	4.17%
Reducing the expenses on medication, hygiene items, clothing	3.25%	2.29%	5.05%	4.48%	1.24%	4.17%
Sending boys (under 18 yr.o.) to work	2.50%	2.16%	1.01%	1.49%	3.72%	0.00%
Begging for food or money	2.00%	2.24%	3.03%	1.49%	5.79%	0.00%
Getting boys (under 18 yr.o.) married	1.25%	0.72%	0.00%	0.00%	1.24%	0.00%
Purchasing food on credit	6.75%	6.98%	3.03%	4.48%	6.20%	4.17%
Stealing food, money or consumable items	2.00%	1.52%	2.02%	2.99%	2.07%	0.00%
Exchanging sex for money	0.75%	0.38%	1.01%	5.97%	0.83%	0.00%


In three provinces, household representatives were also asked what mechanisms households apply to coping with the difficulties they face during the pandemic, in their neighborhoods or immediate surroundings. According to the results obtained from multiple answers, similar coping strategies of both locals and Syrians come to the fore, as can be followed from chart 98 and 99.

Local households are seeing more than 50% postponing payments or bills. Again, we see those coping mechanisms such as borrowing from relatives and acquaintances, shopping on credit from neighborhood grocers, including pharmacies, selling their savings, tending to cheaper foods and clothes, and borrowing food from neighbors and acquaintances, are applied between 40 and 50%. Subsequently, it is seen that various mechanisms have been developed, such as cutting back on nutrition and clothing and giving up on hygiene and health expenditures. Locals coping strategies also include the marriage of girls under 18, around 7%, and sending girls and boys under 18 to work. However, the respondents stated that the domestic households


in all three provinces had to start begging 11%, stealing food around 7%, and prostitution (2.6%) to cope with the difficulties in the pandemic.

As a coping mechanism, close to 50% of Syrian households borrow money from friends and acquaintances, more than 40% borrow money from the local grocery store or pharmacy, 33% turn to cheaper food, 41% of men and 26% of women sell their savings, a quarter of them postpone their bills and debts, 19% reduce their daily meals, an average of 19% borrow from relatives for subsistence (mostly food), an average of 8% send their daughters to work, on average 8% marry their daughters under the age of 18, cut health and hygiene costs, 4% send male household members under the age of 18 to work, and 6.5% of men beg for money.

However, in the absence of adequate and transparent social work and assistance networks, both for the locals and the Syrians, the existence of solidarity and survival strategies based on traditional kinship relations comes to the fore.




**Chart 100: Before the COVID-19 process, in case of a threat to your safety or security, who would you have consulted first for assistance? (only Syrians)**




**Chart 101: Before the COVID-19 process, in case of a threat to your safety or security, who would you have consulted first for assistance? (only locals)**

There are similarities between the locals and Syrians in the three provinces regarding where a household member first consults for security problems for the pre-pandemic period. However, while institutions such as the police, family and relatives, neighbors, friends, and muhtar are the first resorts of the locals, the option of neighbors in Syrians lags by a small margin. Nevertheless, it is possible to understand the neighborhood distance between the locals and Syrians from this data. Still, more detailed long-term studies are required to understand the multidimensional and complex relationships.




**Chart 102: Do you still get the same assistance for your safety and security during the COVID-19 process? (only Syrians)**



**Chart 103: Do you still get the same assistance for your safety and security during the COVID-19 process? (only locals)**


Before the pandemic period, those who saw the support and protection of the actors in chart 100 and chart 101 were asked whether the current support continues. An average of 40% of local households and Syrians stated that the same support continues. But it is interesting to note that more than half of the locals say they have lost this support. About 45% of Syrian households stated that the same support did not continue.

At this point, by the way, it is necessary to emphasize a remarkable fact. We see that locals tend to portray themselves as victims or subalterns more than Syrians in security and protection and many critical issues. Of course, the main reasons for this can be understood through detailed and in-depth interviews.




**Chart 104: Do you feel more excluded from access to services and resources since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only Syrians)**





**Chart 105: Do you feel more excluded from access to services and resources since the outbreak of COVID-19? (by marital status of Syrian female respondents )**




**Chart 106: Do you feel more excluded from access to services and resources since the outbreak of COVID-19? (by province of Syrian respondents)**


The respondents were also asked whether they felt discrimination in accessing the services provided. The percentage of Syrians who answered “I do not know” to this question is 15%. The average is around 10%, who stated that they had already experienced discrimination before

COVID-19. Those who say they do not feel any exclusion now are more than 55%. To put it very clearly, the proportion of Syrians who have been discriminated against is 22% for women and 18% for men. We see that being both a refugee and a woman is a reason for higher rates of discrimination. The percentage of Syrians who are excluded from services after the pandemic is higher in Kilis. The situation we just mentioned for the locals shows up again in the results here. The proportion of locals (around 23%) who feel discriminated against after COVID-19 is higher than Syrians and the proportion is higher in Şanlıurfa. Those who say they already felt discrimination before COVID-19 seem to be the same as Syrians.


Since the interviews in all three provinces were mainly held in the lower classes or the poor life, these results are latent with an explanatory argument: Individuals and household members experience discrimination, first, not because they are Syrian or local, but because they are poor.




**Chart 107: Do you feel more excluded from access to services and resources since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only locals)**




**Chart 108: Do you feel more excluded from access to services and resources since the outbreak of COVID-19? (by marital status of local female respondents)**



**Chart 109: Do you feel more excluded from access to services and resources since the outbreak of COVID-19? (by provinces of local respondents)**



**Chart 110: If yes, why do you think so? (only Syrians)**




**Chart 111: If yes, why do you think so? (only locals)**

Those who stated that they were exposed to discrimination were also asked about the reasons for this. Syrians cite their refugee status as the biggest reason for discrimination. Syrian women, 10% more than men, see being a refugee as a reason for discrimination. This is one of the most important and expected results. Ethnicity is the second most important reason for

discrimination among Syrians. Men mostly feel ethnicity as a reason for discrimination. The result will be better understood when we consider that men are more present than women in business and working life, on the street, and daily life. Syrians also cite the lack of information about resources and services among the reasons for discrimination. Syrian women consider the language barrier and gender as sources of bias more than men.

The most significant causes of discrimination for locals are lack of information about resources and services (more than 40%), travel restrictions during the pandemic, gender (25% for women, 13% for men), ethnicity (26% for men, 17% for women), age and language barriers.




**Chart 112: Before the COVID-19 process, how did women participate in decision-making processes in your community? (only women)**

**Table 29: Before the COVID-19 process, how did women participate in decision-making processes in your community? (by provinces and displacement status of women )**

	SR			TR		
	Gaziantep	Kilis	Şanlıurfa	Gaziantep	Kilis	Şanlıurfa
<b>There are no ways for women to participate in decision-making</b>	38.46%	24.05%	11.11%	22.26%	19.18%	30.35%
<b>Women have their own committees</b>	16.15%	24.47%	28.21%	11.28%	16.67%	12.84%
<b>Women are represented on mixed male-female community committees</b>	15.00%	18.57%	33.76%	13.41%	20.13%	22.96%
<b>I have no idea</b>	22.69%	27.85%	14.96%	39.63%	30.82%	18.68%
<b>Women can share their views through feedback mechanisms</b>	5.77%	4.64%	11.54%	11.89%	11.01%	14.01%
<b>Other</b>	1.92%	0.42%	0.43%	1.52%	2.20%	1.17%
<b>Column Totals</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

**Table 30: Before the COVID-19 process, how did women participate in decision-making processes in your community? (by marital status of women)**

	Single	Legally Married	Marriage not recognized legally	Divorced	Separate	Lost Husband
There are no ways for women to participate in decision-making	28.86%	23.72%	34.85%	19.51%	18.18%	19.38%
Women have their own committees	18.12%	17.73%	13.64%	24.39%	9.09%	17.83%
Women are represented on mixed male-female community committees	27.52%	19.92%	10.61%	19.51%	36.36%	17.05%
I have no idea	12.75%	27.37%	28.79%	19.51%	27.27%	37.98%
Women can share their views through feedback mechanisms	10.74%	10.20%	6.06%	14.63%	9.09%	6.98%
Other	2.01%	1.05%	6.06%	2.44%	0.00%	0.78%
Column Totals	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%



**Chart 113: Has the participation of women in these decision-making processes been affected by the COVID-19 process?**




**Chart 114: Has the participation of women in these decision-making processes been affected by the COVID-19 process? (by province)**


In particular, the question was asked how much women were involved in the decision-making, aid, policymaking, or direction-determining processes in the neighborhoods they lived in during the 'normal' periods before COVID-19. These results, obtained from the questions answered only by women, are remarkable. Women state that they participate in mixed decision-making processes with men (around 24%), the highest for Syrian women living in Şanlıurfa (34%) and the lowest for local women in Gaziantep (13%). However, one of the most striking results is that more than a quarter of Syrian and local women state that women are not included in decision-making, the highest for Syrian women in Gaziantep (39%), and the lowest for Syrian women in Şanlıurfa. From this result, we may interpret that the situation is more disadvantageous for Syrian women in Gaziantep, either they have no influence on decisions taken or they involve only in mixed groups. 25% of Syrian women and 17% of locals said that there are only women committees in the neighborhoods and participate in decisions through these. If we look more detailed by aggregating the results using marital status of women, women who are married but without legal contracts are in the most disadvantageous situations. We see that COVID-19 affects women's participation in these types of committees and meetings. 41% of local women and 23% of Syrians say that COVID-19 restrictions affect involvement in such committees, women living in Kilis affected more adversely by the pandemic. However, an average of 35% of women from both groups says that COVID-19 did not affect this participation. Here, we see that those who can attend the meetings online are decisive.

## Statements about the Attitudes toward the Pandemic

The respondents also asked attitudes and judgments regarding the COVID-19 research field in all three provinces. Uncovering how people living in the same neighborhoods feel during long periods of total lock-down times and limited mobility can provide us with very general data to understand the psychological dimension of the pandemic.



**Chart 115: I feel lonelier or more depressed, stressed, anxious, or irritable since the outbreak of the COVID-19 than I did before.**



**Chart 116: How much anxious are you about COVID-19 on a scale from 1 to 5? (1 is not anxious at all, and 5 is extremely anxious)**

During the pandemic process, locals, regardless of gender, state that they are more lonely, more depressed, more stressed, more anxious, and more easily irritated than Syrians (around 80%). During the COVID-19 process, locals stated that they felt these feelings more heavily than Syrians and local women compared to local men. Among Syrians, women also experience much

more severe emotional processes than men. However, Syrian men (around 57%) and women (about 70%) express that they experienced negative emotions during the COVID-19 period.

Similarly, although there are high rates of anxiety in both segments, it is seen that the anxiety levels of local household members are much higher than that of Syrians (Chart 115, Chart 116).




Chart 117: In the last 14 days, how many days have you stayed at home all day, without going out or receiving any visits? (only Syrians)






Chart 118: In the last 14 days, how many days have you stayed at home all day, without going out or receiving any visits? (only locals)



As will be followed from Chart 117 and Chart 118, it is seen that long total closing times during the COVID-19 process directly impact the psychological states expressed by household members.



**Chart 119: Since you learned COVID-19, have you ever felt more anxious about going to public places, such as schools, health centers, markets, or community centers? (only Syrians)**



**Chart 120: Since you learned COVID-19, have you ever felt more anxious about going to public places, such as schools, health centers, markets, or community centers? (only locals)**

The long lockdown periods of COVID-19, which almost destroyed social interaction and daily life relations, news, information, guidance, and advice published from all media channels, have minimized social considerations in public spaces. We see that since human relations at minimum levels are always masked and distant, it creates a fear of public space. We should also keep in mind: It is not difficult to guess that the neighborhoods and the site in all three provinces have never experienced a total lockdown due to their residential characteristics and residential types because people could somehow go out into the streets or public spaces in the slums and on the neighborhoods of the province. On the other hand, it is understood that the characteristics of these housing, settlement, and social relations in poor communities also allow crowded local and refugee households to breathe under challenging times. The results in Chart

119 and 120 show us that this inference is correct. It is also seen that the number of individuals in the household or the traditional structure of the settlement, housing, and daily life relations in the slums provides the families with the opportunity to find other individuals with whom they can talk or talk about their problems, regardless of gender.





Chart 121: "I feel that there is always someone I can talk to about my day-to-day problems."

## Shelter/Housing

One of the most critical issues in migration and refugee conditions is shelter. As it is known, there is a process in which many factors such as specific locations of cities, rental prices, neighborhoods, homeownership, income-expenditure balances of households and economic level, socio-cultural environment are determinative. Therefore, the survey results are familiar with the housing situation of the local and Syrian households in all three provinces.



**Chart 122: Have you started to share your house with another/more than one family since the outbreak of COVID-19?**

It is known that the COVID-19 process is a much more complicated process, especially for the poor, immigrants, and refugees. When we started the research, we predicted that processes that affect the most vulnerable societies, such as the pandemic, will severely affect family and household structures. In this respect, we observe a change in Syrians' household structures in all three provinces. The rates of those who have started to share their homes with other families during the COVID-19 process can be monitored very clearly in Chart 122. Inclusion of close relatives or acquaintances is seen in approximately 31% of Syrian households and 6% of locals in Şanlıurfa. Among the locals, we found the most changes in the household structure in Gaziantep. The system of domestic households in Kilis and Gaziantep has changed with the

participation of other families. Gathering families in one home can be considered a reflection of a multi-faceted coping strategy.




Chart 123: Do you pay rent for your house?




Chart 124: How much rent do you pay? (Turkish Lira per month; only Syrians)




Chart 125: Boxplot of rent amount in TRY (by the gender of household head and provinces of Syrian respondents)




Chart 126: How much rent do you pay? (Turkish Lira per month; only locals)




Table 31: Average House Rent (TRY)

	SR	TR	Discrepancy
Gaziantep	658.2	730.3	%11.0
Kilis	580.3	637.1	%9.8
Şanlıurfa	602.7	823.7	%36.7
Female Head	562.2	621.1	%10
Male Head	622.1	739.6	%17.2
No Head	468.0	941.3	%67.2




Chart 128: If you are a tenant, has there been any impact of the COVID-19 process on your tenancy (eviction, rent increase, etc.)?

Table 32: If you are a tenant, has there been any impact of the COVID-19 process on your tenancy? (by gender of household head and province)

	Gaziantep			Kilis			Şanlıurfa		
	Female HH	Male HH	No HH	Female HH	Male HH	No HH	Female HH	Male HH	No HH
There was a positive impact	0.00%	5.27%	0.00%	3.08%	1.41%	0.00%	4.84%	2.20%	0.00%
No change	51.52%	56.39%	44.44%	41.54%	48.48%	46.67%	45.16%	42.32%	32.43%
There was a negative impact	48.48%	38.34%	55.56%	55.38%	50.12%	53.33%	50.00%	55.49%	67.57%
Column Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

As expected, almost all Syrians live in rented homes. Because we're considering nearly 99% of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey are registered in urban centers.<sup>35</sup> Syrians have no other option than to live in rented apartments due to economic and legal obstacles. The rental rates of Syrians in the three provinces seem to be in line with the current demographic pattern and legal status. Because in previous studies in Gaziantep, the rate of Syrians living in rented houses was higher than 98%.<sup>36</sup>


In all the three cities, the amount and the range of rentals Syrians reside are similar. But interestingly, the Syrian households which the respondent declared that in their households no one has the role of household head are paying under 500 TRY. The rental price of houses of

<sup>35</sup> <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/> Access: 02.08.2021


<sup>36</sup> Gültekin, M.N., Yücebaş, M., Soyudoğan M., Atasü Topçuoğlu, R., Doğanoglu, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S.T., Aslan, A., İncetahtacı, N., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., Karayakupoglu, H.C., Kaya, M., Açıkgöz, Ü., & Özhasar, İ. (2021). *Gaziantep Monitor 2020: Syrians*. SABEV Yayınları; Gültekin, M.N., Giritlioğlu, İ., Karadaş, Y., Soyudoğan, M., Leyla Kuzu, Ş., Gülhan, S.T., Doğanoglu, M., Utanır, A., Aslan, Ç., İncetahtacı, N., (2018) *Gaziantep'teki Suriyeliler: Uyum, Beklentiler ve Zorluklar (Özet Rapor)*, Gaziantep: Gaziantep Üniversitesi Yayınları.

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




**Chart 129: If you are negatively affected by the COVID-19 process, please describe how? (Gaziantep)**



**Chart 130: If you are negatively affected by the COVID-19 process, please describe how? (Kilis)**



**Chart 131: If you are negatively affected by the COVID-19 process, please describe how? (Şanlıurfa)**

A significant portion of both local and Syrian households stated that they had severe problems with their landlords regarding the rental houses they were living in during the pandemic

period. For example, 35% of Syrians and 50% of locals in Gaziantep; more than half (53%) of Syrians and 44% of locals in Kilis; in Şanlıurfa, 50% of the Syrians and 72% of the locals stated that they had problems with their landlords, mainly in terms of rent increase or eviction.

**Table 35: What challenges are living in this house during the COVID-19 process? (multi-selection)**

	Gaziantep		Kilis		Şanlıurfa	
	SR	TR	SR	TR	SR	TR
Too overcrowded to live comfortably during lockdown/movement restrictions	47.4	54.3	42.9	53.3	31.1	50.9
We don't have separate rooms for the children.	29.1	35.9	39.3	50.5	29.4	47.9
Lack of privacy	22.1	19.9	20.7	16.5	39.0	33.3
Increased risk of eviction as the rent has been increased	27.3	11.7	38.5	12.1	31.1	26.2
Increased risk of eviction as our household income has reduced since the pandemic started	12.1	16.8	36.4	7.1	28.2	24.7
Increased risk of eviction as the landlord wants to sell the property	3.8	1.6	4.7	0.5	11.9	2.7
Increased risk of eviction as the landlord needs to move into the property	2.4	0.8	1.8	0.5	6.8	0.9

**Table 36: What challenges are living in this house during the COVID-19 process? (by gender and province of the respondents)**

	Gaziantep		Kilis		Şanlıurfa	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Too overcrowded to live comfortably during lockdown/movement restrictions	33.96%	33.57%	27.05%	26.50%	21.91%	22.09%
We don't have separate rooms for the children.	23.08%	18.73%	29.10%	18.85%	24.25%	17.67%
Lack of privacy	14.45%	13.43%	13.06%	8.20%	22.24%	17.23%
Increased risk of eviction as the rent has been increased	11.44%	16.96%	13.81%	21.31%	13.04%	17.67%
Increased risk of eviction as our household income has reduced since the pandemic started	9.38%	9.89%	12.50%	18.85%	12.21%	16.20%
Increased risk of eviction as the landlord wants to sell the property	1.88%	1.77%	1.87%	1.91%	3.18%	4.71%
Increased risk of eviction as the landlord needs to move into the property	1.31%	0.71%	0.75%	0.82%	1.67%	2.50%
Other	4.50%	4.95%	1.87%	3.55%	1.51%	1.91%
Column Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

It was also asked what kind of housing problems tenants and landlords have experienced in households during the COVID-19 period. One of the biggest problems encountered is that individuals have to stay in the same physical environment for a long time due to the total lockdown, beyond the crowdedness of the households. The lack of private space for individuals,

privacy, and the constant fear of eviction for tenants are seen as negative consequences experienced by locals and Syrians in all three provinces.

## Legal Needs

In the survey, the respondents were also asked whether they needed legal support (legal counseling and/or assistance) during the COVID-19 process, different from regular times. While it is stated that around 4% of local men and women need legal support, this rate is 5% for Syrian men and 3% for women.





Chart 132: Have your legal needs changed since the outbreak of COVID-19?

Table 37: What types of legal services have you needed during the COVID-19 process?

	Female	Male
Divorce	30.6	18.4
TPID /IPID	12.2	18.4
Alimony	10.2	8.2
Psychological violence (threat, insult, humiliation)	10.2	4.1
Criminal matters (please specify. Examples: traffic accident, homicide, injury, smuggling)	10.2	6.1
Citizenship	10.2	12.2
Physical violence	8.2	2.0
Custody of a child (by mother or father)	4.1	4.1
Landlord disputes	4.1	8.2
Guardianship of a child (by family members)	2.0	4.1
Deportation	2.0	4.1
Residence Permit	2.0	4.1
Work Permit	2.0	10.2
Employee rights	2.0	12.2
Voluntary repatriation	-	2.0

**Table 38: Have you ever received legal support during the COVID-19 process?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Supported by a lawyer appointed by the Bar Association	8.3	28.6	40.0	33.3
Supported by a lawyer from an I/NGO	58.3	42.9	-	11.1
Supported by a private lawyer	33.3	28.6	60.0	55.6

**Chart 133: What type of legal support did you get from the lawyer?**

Only 2.3% of the need in legal matters could be met. The respondents were also asked which topics they needed legal advice on and where they got it. For example, 31% of women and 18% of men need legal divorce advice. On the other hand, it is seen that Syrian men and women most need legal advice on TPID (Temporary Protection ID Card), residency, and work permits. Moreover, it turns out that both locals and Syrians need counseling for their legal problems with their hosts.

Another critical issue is how to reach this legal support. While 10% of Syrian women can only contact lawyers through the Bar Association, the rate of men using this method is around 29%. It also reveals that men have higher rates of out-of-household affairs than women in legal matters. A higher percentage of Syrian women (58%) received legal support from NGOs. One-third of Syrians also state that they receive personal legal support. Locals have a higher rate of Bar Association and private legal advice. During the COVID-19 period, only 2.3% of all households in the three provinces could obtain legal support or access these services.

In addition, the crucial vitality of the services provided by NGOs for Syrian women is once again evident in legal matters.

## Livelihood and Employment

Table 39: What was the main source of your livelihood before the COVID-19 process? (by displacement status and gender of the respondent)

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Daily labor	40.3	39.6	19.3	20.6
No paid activities	17.3	8.2	11.1	8.3
Factory work	14.8	16.6	22.4	15.8
Garment work	10.2	10.0	3.6	2.2
Small trade/small business	8.0	17.1	15.7	23.0
Seasonal worker	4.4	6.7	5.9	5.1
Farming/gardening	4.1	4.4	5.6	6.7
Office jobs	2.7	8.0	4.3	6.9
Livestock	0.6	0.5	1.7	3.2

Table 40: What was the main source of your livelihood before the COVID-19 process? (according to province)

	Gaziantep	Kilis	Şanlıurfa
Daily Labor	15.3	37.0	37.2
Small trade/small business	10.7	14.6	21.1
Factory work	24.2	11.5	17.5
Seasonal worker	2.6	4.9	9.0
No paid activities	16.6	9.1	8.9
Farming/gardening	1.9	4.7	8.5
Office jobs	2.6	6.1	7.2
Garment work	9.8	5.2	5.0
Livestock	0.5	0.8	2.9

When we look at the occupational pattern of the households; 40% of women and men working - in Syrian households - work in daily work, 15% of women and 17% of men are in factories, 10% of both genders are in textile and clothing workshops, 17% of men are in small businesses such as grocery stores, on average 6% Most of them work in seasonal jobs and 4% in agricultural work.

In domestic households, around 20% of men and women work in daily work, 16% of men and 22% of women work in factories, 23% of men work in small commercial enterprises, and 6% in agricultural work on average. More importantly, the results show us that Syrian female-

headed households might be at risk of having no income due to high proportion of them having no paid jobs.

Looking at the provinces, we see that Gaziantep has higher rates in factory work, Şanlıurfa and Kilis in daily work, and Şanlıurfa in agricultural work.

**Table 41: How has the employment status of working individuals in your household changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (multiselection)**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
No change, still working in the same job	46.1	59.3	47.0	60.0
Salary decreased	17.2	16.9	11.3	6.4
Forced/unpaid leave	10.6	8.2	10.7	5.0
The workload increased	7.7	6.4	11.0	8.4
I have been laid off, no new job now	6.6	3.8	8.9	10.7
The workplace has been closed, still unemployed	6.2	3.5	4.6	5.0
I have been laid off, found another job	5.9	8.9	4.4	6.4
Our business has been closed, still unemployed	5.6	3.1	3.1	2.0
The workplace has been closed, found a new job	3.4	3.0	5.7	2.5
Our business has been closed, found another job	2.9	2.6	2.5	1.6
At least one woman in the household started working who did not work before	2.4	2.4	1.6	0.7
At least one boy (under the age of 18) in the household started working who did not work before	1.0	0.7	1.1	1.4
At least one girl (under the age of 18) in the household started working who did not work before	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7

**Table 42: How has the employment status of working individuals in your household changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the household head)**

	SR			TR		
	Female Head	Male Head	No Head	Female Head	Male Head	No Head
No change, still working in the same job	40.52%	43.05%	53.57%	40.00%	43.72%	36.59%
Salary decreased	6.90%	14.69%	10.71%	2.50%	7.72%	10.98%
Forced/unpaid leave	6.03%	7.81%	10.71%	6.25%	6.82%	7.32%
The workload increased	3.45%	6.09%	3.57%	3.75%	8.08%	12.20%
I have been laid off, no new job now	10.34%	3.75%	3.57%	12.50%	7.63%	6.10%
The workplace has been closed, still unemployed	2.59%	4.22%	0.00%	6.25%	3.95%	1.22%
I have been laid off, found another job	7.76%	6.02%	0.00%	3.75%	3.86%	10.98%
Our business has been closed, still unemployed	2.59%	3.75%	0.00%	3.75%	2.24%	0.00%
The workplace has been closed, found a new job	1.72%	2.66%	3.57%	2.50%	3.68%	3.66%
Our business has been closed, found another job	1.72%	2.34%	0.00%	0.00%	1.89%	1.22%
At least one woman in the household started working who did not work before	2.59%	1.95%	0.00%	0.00%	1.17%	0.00%
At least one boy (under the age of 18) in the household started working who did not work before	0.86%	0.63%	3.57%	0.00%	1.17%	0.00%
At least one girl (under the age of 18) in the household started working who did not work before	0.00%	0.31%	0.00%	0.00%	0.45%	0.00%
Other	12.93%	2.73%	10.71%	18.75%	7.63%	9.76%
Column Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


In interviews in the three provinces, employees were also asked about the effects of COVID-19 on the job of workers in households. The answers of 2560 households produced remarkable results. 46% of Syrian women and around 60% of men, whom we interviewed as representatives of the households, stated that there was no change in their job and working status, and they still work in the same place. Similar rates have been found in the locals. On average, 17% of Syrians say their salaries have decreased, around 10% are forced to work for free, on average, 7% of their workload has increased, about 7% of women and 4% of men have stopped working, 6% of women and 4% of men have lost their jobs. They stated that it was closed, and they were still unemployed at the time of data collection. For both Syrian and local female-headed households, losing the job and not having found a new one is higher than other groups.

Among the locals, 47% of women and 60% of men stated that there was no change in their job status. We see that the salaries of 11% of women and 6% of men have decreased, the highest salary decrease has been found in the households having Syrian-male household




heads. 11% of women and 5% of men stated that they were forced to work for free, 11% of men and 9% of women indicated that they were taken on unpaid leave by the workplace.

In general terms, we can see that Syrians are more vulnerable than locals, and women are more vulnerable than men in work and employment.




**Chart 134: If there is no change and still working, how have the working conditions been affected since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only Syrians)**



**Chart 135: If there is no change and still working, how have the working conditions been affected since the outbreak of COVID-19? (only locals)**

People who have not changed their jobs and salaries due to the pandemic were asked how their working conditions were affected by this process. More than the half of local male-headed households and 34% of female-headed households said conditions worsened. 53% of local female-headed households declared that their working conditions remained same while for 57% of Syrian female-headed households stated their conditions worsened.



**Chart 136: Did you get remittances before the COVID-19 process?**




Chart 137: Did you get humanitarian assistance (ESSN, cash for work, training, etc.) before the COVID-19 process?

Table 43: Distribution of Other Types of Income (according to provinces)

	Gaziantep	Kilis	Şanlıurfa
Remittances	20.4	31.5	42.8
Humanitarian assistance (ESSN, cash for work, cash for training, etc.)	28.7	47.6	45.7

Table 44: How were these income sources affected by the COVID-19 process? (according to provinces)

	Gaziantep		Kilis		Şanlıurfa	
	SR	TR	SR	TR	SR	TR
Amount decreased	63.6	49.8	56.2	53.4	51.7	67.5
Amount increased	12.1	6.9	4.5	1.1	9.4	1.3
Not Changed, income remained the same	16.1	40.2	37.1	40.2	31.9	19.7
Stopped receiving these additional incomes	8.3	3.1	2.2	5.2	6.9	11.5

Table 45: How were these income sources affected by the COVID-19 process? (by displacement status and gender of the household head)

	SR			TR		
	Female Head	Male Head	No Head	Female Head	Male Head	No Head
Amount decreased	63.96%	56.27%	68.00%	31.88%	60.87%	56.25%
Amount increased	4.50%	9.51%	0.00%	7.25%	2.74%	4.17%
Not changed, income source remained same	26.13%	28.33%	24.00%	56.52%	28.99%	33.33%
Stopped receiving these additional income sources	5.41%	5.88%	8.00%	4.35%	7.41%	6.25%
Column total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

**Table 46: How has your household income amount changed since the outbreak of COVID-19?**

	Gaziantep		Kilis		Şanlıurfa	
	SR	TR	SR	TR	SR	TR
<b>Our income decreased</b>	79.7	65.0	74.3	63.0	71.4	80.7
<b>Our income increased</b>	4.7	1.8	2.4	1.3	6.4	1.0
<b>Remained the same</b>	15.7	33.2	23.2	35.8	22.2	18.3

**Table 47: How has your household income amount changed since the outbreak of COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the household head)**

	SR			TR		
	Female Head	Male Head	No Head	Female Head	Male Head	No Head
<b>Our income decreased</b>	82.20%	74.50%	72.73%	56.70%	70.66%	68.85%
<b>Our income increased</b>	2.54%	4.66%	4.55%	2.06%	1.27%	1.64%
<b>Remained the same</b>	15.25%	20.84%	22.73%	41.24%	28.07%	29.51%
<b>Column Totals</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The respondents were also asked about their other sources of income and their change. 27% of the Syrian women and 42% of the Syrian men have remittances, while 32% of the local women and 28% of local men have remittances.

Within the scope of humanitarian aid support, the proportion of Syrian women who say they receive approval for work or education is around 53%, while about 55% for men. 27% of local women and 20% of men benefited from the same support.

When we consider “other” incomes based on provinces (Table 43), we see that local and Syrian households in Şanlıurfa and Kilis have a higher rate. The main determining factor in this is that Gaziantep has more significant advantages than the other two provinces in terms of job and employment opportunities.


In general terms, it seems possible to say that household incomes have been adversely affected by COVID-19. According to both provinces and Syrians and locals, the pandemic period led to a decrease in household incomes in absolute terms (Table 46 and Table 47). While Syrian female-headed households has been affected most adversely among others, the local-female-headed households has been affected at the least adverse rates.

## Pandemic and the Financial Resilience


The respondents in three provinces were asked about the financial capacity they had. With these questions, it was desired to measure the ability to meet the basic needs of daily life compared to the pre-COVID-19 situation. These results also revealed whether there was an increase or decrease in the opportunities of the households. In the results, it is seen that there are severe capacity changes in the titles such as basic food, rent/accommodation, health services, medicine, transportation/travel.

When comparing the locals and the Syrians, interesting parallels and patterns emerge between the two groups living in similar neighborhoods. When the figures between Chart 138 and Chart 150 are scrutinized, the capacity status of both communities will be understood much more clearly. For example, the capacity of households to purchase food decreased by 62% in local households in Şanlıurfa and by 53% in Syrian households. While the lowest capacity decrease occurred in local households in Kilis with 37%, 56% of Syrian households in the same province stated that their food purchasing power decreased.


According to the characteristics of the provinces, it is possible to say that COVID-19 has adverse effects on households in all items from food to shelter, except expenses related to medicine and health services. Locals' financial capacity to meet the expenses of rent is less adversely affected than Syrians. There is also a difference between Syrians' and locals' capacity for health and medicine expenses, the decrease is much bigger for locals. This decrease in capacity means that the pressures on these households, already living in difficult conditions, increase. It is not difficult to foresee that increasing pressures threaten social cohesion and living together and affect domestic relations and patterns.




**Chart 138: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of food changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19?**




**Chart 139: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of food changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the respondents)**




**Chart 140: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of bills changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19?**



**Chart 141: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of bills changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the respondents)**



**Chart 142: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of rent changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19?**



**Chart 143: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of rent changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the respondents)**



Chart 144: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of health services changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19?






Chart 145: How has your financial capacity to meet the expenses of health services changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the respondents)



**Chart 146: How has your financial capacity to meet medicine expenses changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19?**




**Chart 147: How has your financial capacity to meet medicine expenses changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the respondents)**





**Chart 148: How has your financial capacity to meet transportation expenses changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19?**



**Chart 149: How has your financial capacity to meet transportation expenses changed since the outbreak of the COVID-19? (by displacement status and gender of the respondents)**

As shown in Table 48, all these difficulties, shortages, and loss of capacity cause severe pressures on individuals working in households. When this pressure is combined with the work and working conditions in the pandemic conditions, it is reflected both local and Syrian households as more exploitation, having to work for very long periods, being forced to stay in unhealthy work and working environments, and flexible working.

Table 48: What kind of risks do you think has emerged for the workers since the outbreak of COVID-19?

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Unpaid leave	31.3	32.0	52.7	50.3
Obligation to work in unsanitary conditions	24.0	23.1	44.3	46.5
Long working hours	36.2	34.3	42.3	47.7
Adequate covid measures are not taken in workplaces	11.0	17.3	35.3	37.6
Fee reductions	32.0	38.7	35.1	36.2
Flexible work	5.6	8.4	33.2	34.2
Transportation is dangerous in terms of the risks of COVID	16.9	21.5	26.0	30.6
None	11.7	10.0	3.4	4.0





Chart 150: Do you think your workplace is offering the appropriate measures to protect against COVID-19?


On the other hand, we see those individuals working in both Syrian and local households are forced to work in places where adequate precautions are not taken, under pandemic conditions such as COVID-19, that carry very high risks. As can be seen in Chart 150, only around one-third of working individuals in households stated that health conditions are provided in their workplaces. We can claim that these results reflect a realistic situation. Because all adequate information and warnings made in Turkey since the first months of 2020 have reached all social groups. Regarding the COVID-19 measures, we can say that these results emerged with the knowledge of all ordinary people in daily life about the healthy working environment.

## Social Cohesion


Since 2011, the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey has also constituted the most crucial part of the multidimensional phenomenon of living together, cohesion, and integration. As the field of research in all three provinces reveals, the issue of Syrians in Turkey, beyond their legal status, is also a phenomenon of meeting the poor and living together. The class dimension of the phenomenon should always be kept in mind, but the class reality will be insufficient to understand the whole issue. The issue of Syrians in Turkey also functions as a ground on which many social issues or problems in Turkey are discussed. Therefore, while the subject of cohesion is concerned, not only the class perspective or the multidimensional encounters of the poor in daily life but also the prejudices, tensions, competition for jobs, exploitation of cheap labor, political populist discourses, realistic human stories that are attached to this class feature and often go along with it. The complex and multi-layered processes that accompany it should also be considered.




**Chart 151: Is there any factor that increased the tensions between the Syrians and the locals in your neighborhood during the COVID-19 process?**




**Chart 152: Is there any factor that increased the tensions between the Syrians and the locals in your neighborhood during the COVID-19 process? (according to provinces)**



**Chart 153: Prejudices against the Syrians have increased during the COVID-19 process.**



**Chart 154: Pressure on shared access to services (e.g., health, education, social welfare, etc.) has increased.**



**Chart 155: Pressure over income and earning opportunities has increased.**

We see that the pandemic period, in which both locals and Syrians are heavily affected, shapes the households in the neighborhoods and the intra-family relations. Both Syrians and locals state that the tension between the two groups has increased in regular periods (before

the pandemic). On average, 23% of Syrians noted that the tension between them and their local neighbors has increased compared to regular times. 35% of men and 26% of women talk about rising tensions in locals. However, based on provinces, it is noteworthy that the results in Şanlıurfa are higher than the other two provinces.

An average of 43% of Syrians speaks of an increasing prejudice towards refugees. In addition, 42% of local women and 36% of men agree with the idea that prejudices against Syrians have increased.

46% of Syrian women and 58% of men stated that the tension between both groups increased during the COVID-19 period; 49% of local men and 54% of women say that these tensions are seen mostly when they receive health and education and social service support. This is understandable since the social contacts of Syrians and locals mostly take place in these places, and there are tensions in the social spaces where the relations take place.

The most striking and expected result is that the highest tension rates are observed in both groups' income and employment processes. For example, 58% of Syrian women and men, 64% of local men, and 67% of women stated that tensions arose against Syrians mostly in employment and income (meaning aid distributed to Syrians).

On the other hand, Table 49, Table 50, Table 51, and Table 52 demonstrate how the tensions we have just outlined can build social distances in everyday life. We see that the already existing tensions between Syrians and locals continue as they do. More than 50% of Syrians and locals reaffirm that such tensions exist. Some say that curfews and movement restrictions are a factor that reduces tension to a minimal extent.

**Table 49: How did the COVID-19 process affect your neighbor relations/visits to the other community?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Tensions between neighbors remained the same	59.4	53.4	51	49.6
Neighborhood relations/visits weakened due to bans	13.5	19.2	19.4	18.9
Tensions between neighbors increased	11.6	10.8	12.3	14.9
I do not know	10.0	5.2	11.7	10.6
Our neighbors have started to help us more	6.5	8.7	5.5	4.2
Cooperation between the two sides increased	5.2	7.6	7.3	6.2
Our neighbors have started to help us less	5.0	5.2	3.4	4
We began to help them more	4.4	7.7	7.7	5.2
Neighbors started to visit each other more	1.8	4.2	1.9	2.2

However, between 10% and 15% of local and Syrian respondents expressed that new tensions have arisen and increased. It should be noted that neighbor visits and solidarity, among the most important daily life interactions in neighborhoods, are also at a minimum level.

**Table 50: How did the COVID-19 process affect your friendship relations/visits to the locals' households?**

	Gaziantep		Kilis		Şanlıurfa	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Negative	16.3	28.5	27.1	29.8	34.0	32.8
Remained the same	69.2	68.6	67.1	63.6	53.2	49.6
Positive	4.2	2.3	2.2	4.0	6.4	9.2
I do not know	10.4	0.6	3.6	2.5	6.4	8.4

**Table 51: How did the COVID-19 process affect your friendship relations/visits to the Syrian households?**

	Gaziantep		Kilis		Şanlıurfa	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Negative	20.0	28.7	27.5	47.5	26.6	35.9
Remained the same	70.5	59.1	60.7	42.0	55.7	51.2
Positive	2.5	0.9	1.2	2.5	6.8	4.6
I do not know	7.0	11.3	10.5	8.0	10.9	8.3

**Table 52: How did the COVID-19 process affect your relative-kinship relations/visits?**

	SR		TR	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Negative	40.1	47.9	80.9	78.9
Remained the same	53.9	44.8	14.0	16.1
Positive	5.0	5.8	3.9	3.2
I do not know	1.1	1.5	1.2	1.8

The result is that the relations of household members with Syrians or locals outside the household remain the same. Very interesting but consistent with previous results, Şanlıurfa is a province with the highest rate of hostile relations between locals and Syrians.

On the other hand, locals and Syrians in all three provinces state that visits to close relatives decreased at a very high rate during the pandemic period. These results are not surprised due to pandemics.

The situations and outcomes listed below from Chart 156 to Chart 172 reveal interesting patterns in showing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on locals, Syrians, women, and men.




Chart 156: Availability of support from friends has decreased during the COVID-19 process.





Chart 157: How much has your involvement in cleaning changed due to the COVID-19 process?

Women



Men




Chart 158: How much has your involvement in cooking changed due to the COVID-19 process?

Women



Men





Chart 159: How much has your involvement in childcare changed due to the COVID-19 process?

Women



Men





Chart 160: How much has your involvement in shopping changed due to the COVID-19 process?



Women




Men



Chart 161: How much has your involvement in elderly care changed due to the COVID-19 process

Women



Men





Chart 162: How much has your involvement in care for the disabled changed due to the COVID-19 process?

Women



Men







Chart 163: How much has your involvement in care for the sick changed due to the COVID-19 process?




**Chart 164: For working to earn money for yourself, how much has your decision-making role changed due to the COVID-19 process?**



**Chart 165: For buying or selling assets, how much has your decision-making role changed due to the COVID-19 process?**




**Chart 166: For migration/displacement, how much has your decision-making role changed due to the COVID-19?**




**Chart 167: For access to health care for yourself, how much has your decision-making role changed due to COVID-19?**

Women




Men




**Chart 168: For access to health care for children, how much has your decision-making role changed due to COVID-19?**


Women




Men




**Chart 169: For having another child, how much has your decision-making role changed due to COVID-19?**



**Chart 170: For children's school attendance, how much has your personal decision-making role changed due to COVID-19?**



**Chart 171: For which daughters should marry, how much has your decision-making role changed due to COVID-19?**



**Chart 172: For which sons should marry, how much has your decision-making role changed due to COVID-19?**

55% of Syrian men and 63% of locals say that the support and assistance they need have decreased. This rate is 58% for Syrian women and more than 60% for locals.

When we look at the relations within the household, we see a picture that affects men as well, while the results against women in certain household chores are getting worse. For example, 79% of Syrian women and around 88% of local women state that their cleaning work has increased or gotten worse. The situation is not different for men, as well. Although not as much as women, there is a severe increase in their role in cleaning the house during the pandemic.

The crucial roles of women in cooking have increased even more during the pandemic period. More than half of the local women and 39% of the Syrians stated that they spent more time preparing food.

The situation against women in the care of children has become more and more severe during the pandemic period. 58% of Syrian and local women say that they have started to spend much more time cooking. Local men (37%) had the lowest increase in childcare. But about half of Syrian men say their burden has increased even more.

For shopping, 37% of local women and 9% of Syrians state that their load has increased. But more than half of Syrian women say that their burden has decreased. Among men, we see that local men have a higher rate of shopping than Syrians.

During the pandemic period, 74% of Syrian women and 67% of locals stated that their burdens did not change in the care of older adults at home; 29% of local women indicated that their responsibilities increased, while this rate is 20% for Syrian women. Moreover, more than 70% of Syrian and local men in the care of older adults state that their situation has not changed. Here, we need to keep in mind that for both social structures, the patriarchal value system assigns women the heaviest domestic roles such as cooking, housework, cleaning, caring for children, the disabled, the sick, and the elderly, and legitimizes this.

We also see other remarkable transformations within the same household patterns. With the pandemic process, the role of personal decision-making in the household has regressed or weakened to the detriment of women. Compared to pre-pandemic, both for locals and Syrians, both for women and men declared their decisive role on working for a fee increased. The increase is bigger for men. .

There does not seem to be much change in these matters for men because the legal possibilities and limits of buying and selling household assets are obvious (Chart 165). Similarly, 17% of local women and 40% of Syrian women state that their role has increased in the migration or relocation of the household/family. Even though the power to make decisions increased for both genders, the effect is bigger for men, especially local men in their households gained more power to decide whether to migrate or not.


In decision making related to accessing individual health services, 46% of Syrian women and 28% of local women say their role increased. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that 23% of

local women stated that their access to individual health services has decreased. However, it is possible to say that restricting access to health institutions and hospitals due to total lockdown is very effective.

Similarly, 33% of local women and 49% of Syrian women state that their role in accessing health care for children has increased during the COVID-19 period. The fact that women are more interested in children and their health problems in the household and their role in this direction increases is a result that can be understood within this framework, arising from both social groups' dominant patriarchal value system. However, while women's responsibilities and roles increase regarding the problems of existing children in the household, their power to make decisions in having a new child, in other words, getting pregnant, have not decreased substantially. Therefore, it is possible to say that the pandemic period further strengthens the phenomenon of unwanted pregnancy for women their lack of power on their bodies

Women's roles have not increased much in terms of children going to school, girls or boys getting married, and we see that they remain at almost pre-pandemic levels or lost power relatively.

## Survey of the Adolescents in Education



**Chart 173: I attend classes regularly.**

The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on society seem to last for decades. The pandemic has deeply affected all social groups. However, its impact on vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, women, immigrants, refugees, the disabled, and the poor was much more severe. It turns out that the impact of school-age children and young people from this process is related to the current conditions of their families or households.

In the field, in some household samples, the educational experiences of school-aged children and youth during the pandemic were also asked. Despite all the difficulties and deficiencies, the face-to-face education adventures of children in local and Syrian households contain interesting points.

While 75% of Syrian girls and 45% of boys regularly attend online classes, 47% of local girls and 39% of boys say they participate in online courses regularly. These rates clearly show that face-to-face education is not practical for children mainly living in poor provinces where the field research was conducted.

The face-to-face education table becomes apparent regarding the reasons for these rates (Chart 173). 60% of local children and 29% of Syrians cite the lack of essential tools for remote learning such as internet connection, computer, tablet as the most significant reasons. Even in families with an internet connection, the rate of local and Syrian children who state no healthy data traffic is 20% or more. Around 10% of Syrian and local children in some households said they do not even know how to connect to the internet.


Another dramatic picture in remote learning stems from the physical characteristics of the households' houses. In general, the number of people in the families is crowded, but the number of rooms is less than the number of individuals. For 15% of children, there is no quiet room at home where they can attend online classes. The biggest reason why 57% of Syrian children and




30% of locals cannot fully concentrate on the lessons is the physical condition of the children's houses. These results emerge because the household is getting crowded due to the pandemic.

Afterward, we learn that 14% of Syrian children and 25% of locals miss their online lessons due to various reasons. The biggest reason for this is that, as mentioned before, the number of school-aged children in the household is not equal to the number of devices required to connect to the online course in the home. Most houses did not have computers and tablets anyway, and smartphones were used for online lessons. One of the biggest problems is that these devices belong to older household members, are constantly interrupted by messages and calls, and the elders in the household take the devices with them when they leave the house. The other important fact related to this is that in online lessons, when the number of devices is not equal to the number of children, the parents choose a latent hierarchy to share the device among the children who have the lesson simultaneously.

On the other hand, 10% of local children and 14% of Syrians stated that they could not attend classes because they started working during the remote learning period. When all these reasons are considered, children's picture about remote learning becomes apparent.




**Chart 174: Students' Problems and Challenges in Education during the COVID-19 Process (by the displacement status)**




**Chart 175: Problems and Challenges in Education during the COVID-19 Process (according to parents)**

Parents in households also support the difficulties encountered in remote learning, which children voiced. But parents add another dimension to their troubles and problems. Both Syrian and local parents state that schools and the national education system are inadequate in providing necessary guidance to children in the remote learning process (Chart 175). In addition, to socio-economic reasons such as lack of technological infrastructure and lack of devices in households, the opinion that children are not provided with the necessary guidance especially comes to the fore. However, more than half of the Syrian parents (57%) stated that the language problem in education is one of the most significant handicaps in remote learning. As we mentioned before, remote learning has caused a severe interruption in the language learning


process of Syrian children, and the language problem has turned into a kind of negative boomerang for them in remote learning.




**Chart 176: Is remote learning or face-to-face education better? (according to students, by displacement status)**




**Chart 177 : Is remote learning or face-to-face education better? (according to students, by gender)**




**Chart 178: Can you sufficiently contact your class or schoolmates during the remote learning period? (by displacement status)**




**Chart 179: Can you sufficiently contact your class or schoolmates during the remote learning period? (by gender)**




**Chart 180: What are the challenges of communication? (according to students)**




**Chart 181: How do you solve your problems related to your lessons?**



**Chart 182: Before the pandemic (while attending face-to-face education), who helped you most at home with your subjects and assignments? (multiselection)**



**Chart 183: Who has helped you most with your subjects and assignments during the remote learning period? (multiselection)**



**Chart 184: In the remote learning period during the COVID-19 pandemic, what issues related to you were discussed in the family? (multiselection)**

Almost all school-age children support face-to-face education rather than remote learning. Interestingly, 73% of Syrian children and 31% of local children state that they keep in touch with their classmates during the remote learning process. However, 25% of Syrians claim that they do not need communication due to difficulties communicating with their classmates. The rate of not communicating with classmates due to lack of telephone and internet is 25% for Syrians and 33% for locals. The rate of local children who say that their friends' homes are far away is 29%. In this sense, Syrians do not see distance as a reason for communicating with friends. Worrying about contracting the disease is why 71% of local children, while 25% of Syrian children see contagion as a barrier to meeting with their classmates. Total lockdowns have been the most significant reason, with 50% for Syrians and 75% for locals.

School-age children used different tools to solve their problems during the remote learning process. One of the most interesting and promising results for the future is that 53% of Syrian children stated that they sought help from their neighbors for the problems they encountered in remote learning. Because asking for help from neighbors is around 9% for locals. All children say that they receive support from their household/family members at a rate of 26%. In addition, 31% of local children and 13% of Syrians say families buy materials and documents to support remote learning. In both groups, 6% of children stated that they benefited from private trainers.

In regular times, in in-class education, 17% of local children and 47% of Syrians state that they receive help from their classmates in their lessons. On the other hand, 48% of local children and 49% of Syrian children say that they do not receive help in regular in-class education. While 14% of local children seek help from teachers, this rate is around 7% for Syrian children.

Children were also asked who helped them with their lessons and homework during the remote learning process. Interestingly, 20% of Syrian children are relatives, 7% parents, 20% classmates, 7% teachers, and 13% local acquaintances. 43% of local children receive no help

from anyone. 23% of them stated that they wanted help from their parents, 11% from their classmates, and 5% from their teachers.

However, according to the answers given by the children, 28% of the local families supported their children in the remote learning process. Despite everything, more than half of the Syrian and local families who think that children should continue their education have declared this to their children. In addition, 43% of Syrian households and 16% of locals tried to send children to work. But the more striking result is that 14.3% of Syrian children and 9.4% of locals stated that they dropped out of school. These results are very high and heartbreaking for the children and the future.

## Statements of School-Age Children on the Education During the Pandemic

During the pandemic, the most striking attitudes towards education are that children feel far behind in education based on socialization and interaction. His judgments on this matter seem correct and appropriate. In particular, local children stated that their friendship relations have decreased higher than Syrians. Both Syrian and local children said that the success in the lessons dropped in remote learning. The percentage of Syrian children who say that remote learning has negatively affected language learning is around 80%. Children expressed that their responsibilities at home have increased due to being at home constantly during the pandemic period. Again, we see that about 30% of children stop attending online classes for various reasons.




Chart 185: My relations with my friends deteriorated due to remote learning.




Chart 186: In remote learning, my course performance has dropped compared to the period before the pandemic.




Chart 187: Remote Learning negatively affected my language learning process.






Chart 188: I got a job because I don't feel I must go to school.




Chart 189: My household chores and caring responsibilities have increased during the COVID-19 process.




Chart 190: I stopped attending the remote learning process because I do not see any benefit.




Chart 191: Who are the most vulnerable people during the COVID-19 process? (according to students)



Chart 192: How much has your involvement in cleaning changed due to the COVID-19 process?




Chart 193: How much has your involvement in cooking changed due to the COVID-19 process?




Chart 194: How much has your involvement in childcare changed due to the COVID-19 process?




Chart 195: How much has your involvement in shopping changed due to the COVID-19 process?



Chart 196: How much has your involvement in elderly care changed due to the COVID-19 process?




**Chart 197: How much has your involvement in care for the disabled changed due to the COVID-19 process?**



**Chart 198: How much has your involvement in care for the sick changed due to the COVID-19 process?**

Children were also asked how they generally felt during the pandemic. Overall, more than 80% of local children and 50% of Syrians report feeling lonely, depressed, anxious, and uncomfortable with everything. But when we look at gender, 86% of girls and 60% of boys express that they feel this way.



**Chart 199: I feel lonelier or more depressed, stressed, anxious, or irritable since the outbreak of the COVID-19 than I did before.**




Chart 200: How much anxious are you about COVID-19 on a scale from 1 to 5? (1 is not anxious at all, and 5 is extremely anxious)

Similarly, around 45% of Syrian children and more than 55% of locals say they have been adversely affected by COVID-19.




Chart 201: What should people do to protect themselves from COVID-19? (according to nationality)

Children's awareness of COVID-19 is also interesting. It is seen that these groups of school-age, who use social media and the internet intensively within their means, know to protect themselves from COVID-19. Furthermore, we see that children clearly express the most vital elements in the transmission of COVID-19, such as the use of masks and gloves, washing hands, and social distance.





Chart 202: What should people do to protect themselves from COVID-19? (according to gender)



Chart 203: Do you know anyone in your community whose test for COVID-19 has come out positive? (according to gender)

Children were also asked about those around them who tested positive for COVID-19. Again, equally, Syrian boys and girls (25%) stated that they knew those who tested positive. However, local girls (59%) have a lower awareness rate than boys (78%).



**Chart 204: Do you know anyone in your community whose test for COVID-19 has come out positive? (according to provinces)**

77% of children in Gaziantep, 48% in Şanlıurfa, and 42% in Kilis stated that at least one person they know and know has COVID-19 disease.

From the eyes of children and school-age students, the answers to the questions we asked to find out what was going on around them yielded interesting results. According to children, the groups most adversely affected by COVID-19 are older women and men. Interestingly, half of the Syrian children (students) say that around 70% of the local children and the elderly are the most affected. More than 10% of children from both groups see disabled people, 36% of local children see adolescents as affected.

According to the children, as a result of staying at home during the COVID-19 period, some of the jobs they did in the household increased, while others did not differ much. According to children, there was an increase in tasks such as cleaning, cooking, taking care of the children, and shopping.

On the other hand, children state that due to being at home, their burden in caring for the elderly, the sick, the disability increases, as made mainly by women at home. There is not much difference in these rates between locals and Syrians.

# Conclusion and

# Recommendations

The data obtained from the interviews with 2560 respondents in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis attempted to present the general household situation of the locals and the Syrians in the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 process, particularly experienced by women, children, refugees, and other vulnerable groups, has revealed the class differences that have already existed and the social relations that were reshaped. Moreover, many issues, from health to education, from neighborhood to work and study, have been triggered by the pandemic and thus have been rediscussed. Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for this is that COVID-19 is a global phenomenon that breaks all social relations patterns and affects all social groups and classes. Indeed, the survey results in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa not only reflect the local experiences of the pandemic but also give an idea about this significant global crisis.

We have seen intensity in the last ten years of migration and asylum experiences of those interviewed Syrians in the field between 2014 and 2017. Most of the Syrians settled in the provinces they are currently in, and during the last one and a half years of the pandemic, as expected, they did not move much.

In terms of demographics, both the local and the Syrian households have a younger population than the Turkish average. Besides retaining the youngest population, Şanlıurfa has the most crowded household sizes among the locals and the Syrians.

Additionally, most of the respondents, regardless of civil or religious contract, are married. Although most of the respondents are women, there is a clear predominance of men as the head of the household among the locals and Syrian families. This finding indicates a solid patriarchal value system in both groups.

In 13% of the Syrian households, at least one person has the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey. According to previous studies, there is an increase in these rates, although not very significant. However, it is remarkable that at least one person in 22% of the households in Şanlıurfa has obtained citizenship.

Having a paid job is high in both groups. However, the rate of women participating in the workforce is at the lowest in Şanlıurfa.

The number of disabled people and people in need of care in the households is above the average for Turkey. As expected, whereas the elderly in need is higher for the locals' households, the Syrian households have a high proportion of disabled individuals. In the locals' households, older individuals more frequently state health problems. Chronic diseases of

women in the age group of 25-49 are more common in both groups. Therefore, it is necessary for local public institutions and NGO policy makers to focus on women in poor neighborhoods and their health damaged by heavy domestic work through more subject-oriented in-depth interviews. Although the rate for Syrian women between 25-49 is lower, their health complaints, especially psychological moods, should be considered in post-pandemic studies.

Almost all households have at least one school-age child. Therefore, education is one of the primary issues common to both groups. In addition, despite the difficulties in detecting the correct number through household-based surveys, it has been found that there are child-workers at around 1%. However, further questions imply that the rate of child labor is much higher than stated. Especially the questions about the effects of the pandemic on education indicate a higher rate. Naturally, the Syrian households tend to hide their children's working for fear of deportation; however, due to the traditional codes, child-worker is a bit more explicit phenomenon in the locals' households under the name of "going to learn the craft" or "apprenticeship." Even though the gathered data reveals that the children in the households of both the locals and the Syrians had to drop out of school and work, or they were forced to do so by their families, understanding better the phenomenon of children who must work requires a long-term, in-depth, and more subject-oriented interviews that would focus specifically on certain business lines and workplaces.

As to the problems in remote learning during the COVID-19 process, both groups' households in all three provinces experience them severely. In addition to the fundamental infrastructure problems, many different reasons, such as the household size, the number of children and rooms, the type of heating, and the physical structure of the families live, have been effective in remote learning.

During the remote learning process, the public institutions and NGOs in Turkey carried out very different activities to improve the situation of children and families in all three provinces; however, children remained to be among the groups most affected by the pandemic since these attempts have not solved the negative issues experienced by the children and households. Moreover, since only the supply of internet connection or device is insufficient to overcome the real problems in crowded and low-income families, children have experienced severe losses. Therefore, it would be more realistic for public institutions and NGOs providing support in these areas, albeit in small numbers, to focus on the other conditions in which children and households live.

The interruption of face-to-face education has, once more, revealed the situation of the children dependent on the school's opportunities. Face-to-face education is vital, especially for children who do not have sufficient technical and financial opportunities. In the case of the Syrian children, remote learning was a severe setback for their language learning which opened the door to socialization, integration, and cohesion. Therefore, to prevent further problems in education, the public institutions and other NGOs should focus on Syrian children's language



learning more because the number of households and children who state that they receive such support is at a minimum level. Moreover, the support given to the households should not be limited to aid in cash and should be shifted to much more permanent kinds. For example, supportive activities in education are as important as cash and in-kind aid for the households affected by the pandemic.

Another clear result of this survey is that neither children nor their parents are satisfied with remote learning, although it has become a reality for children and households for about a year and a half. Therefore, remote learning requires more multidimensional and detailed programs. Furthermore, NGOs and institutions in this field need to work on programs that will compensate for the setbacks and lack of communication among students, parents, school administrations, and teachers. Both the locals' and Syrian households emphasize the decrease in eagerness to attend school during remote learning.

As to the knowledge about COVID-19, the high rates are quite surprising. It appears that all the media tools have performed with an unprecedented intensity and coordination in the history of the world and become extraordinarily effective in achieving their purpose.

On the other hand, despite the huge amount of awareness of and information about COVID-19, it is obvious that there is still much to go. It is a fact that a significant number of people in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa have been infected with the virus. Indeed, most of the 2560 respondents have acquaintances and relatives whose PCR test results are positive. Still, these people cannot take a test because of many factors, including poverty and being stigmatized. Therefore, it seems that there is a serious need for substantial assistance and other programs. Public institutions or NGO policymakers need to focus on this issue as well seriously and urgently.

As to the positive test results, Şanlıurfa, in terms of the locals and the Syrians, has more positive results for COVID-19. However, at the same time, the respondents in Şanlıurfa have more access (in 90% of cases) to health services after they got the positive results.

On the other hand, the provision of other health services has been significantly hindered by the COVID-19 measures and priority in hospitals and the fear of getting infected by the virus.

In the prospect post-COVID-19 normalization period, it seems that rehabilitation programs will be needed to include these fragile groups. During the interviews, it was understood that applying for the HES code, which was not among the options, was one of the biggest problems, especially for the working Syrians. It is difficult for the Syrians, who do not have an ID card issued by the Republic of Turkey, to use public transportation because they cannot obtain a HES code. As a result, the Syrians must walk long distances to commute, which means a severe waste of time.

The implementation period of the survey is also a period in which vaccination has started. It is noteworthy that the Syrian respondents are more skeptical about vaccination than the locals. Therefore, there is a need for information programs about the COVID-19 vaccine and individual

and public health. However, it is possible to observe that the general tendency on this issue has started to change positively in all groups living in Turkey.

Services related to family planning and pregnancy have been seriously disrupted, as well. Only nearly half of the women who answered these questions, which are very difficult to answer, stated that they could receive health services on birth, pregnancy control, and family planning. Therefore, in the post-COVID-19 normalization periods, it must focus on women's health services in these neighborhoods. NGOs must directly contact the the public health institutions playing a dominant role among both groups to yield more positive results.

An encouraging result of the survey is that, despite everything, NGOs work hard to compensate for the important lacks in the daily lives of the Syrians. In the cases when public services are disrupted for various reasons, the support provided by NGOs is vital.

As expected, delays in renewing and obtaining TPID and other official documents are among the main problems the Syrians encountered during the pandemic. Moreover, the difficulties in employment and housing security and sometimes travel permits adversely affect the Syrians' daily lives.

Both the locals and the Syrians stated that mostly the older adults were the victims during the pandemic. Also, both groups said that many social groups, from people with disabilities to refugees, were negatively affected by COVID-19. Therefore, during the post-pandemic period, programs of re-integration, socialization, and interaction will be needed to integrate vulnerable groups into their neighborhoods. Furthermore, the necessity and urgency of long-term policies to compensate for any violence experienced by other household members are evident.

The increase in violence and abuse against women in domestic relations during the COVID-19 process is remarkable. Although their rates have changed, it is noteworthy that both the local and Syrian women stated that violence and abuse increased during the COVID-19 process. The rate of those who said the amount and frequency of violence and abuse did not change is very high; still, this statement could mean that these women were already abused before the emergence of the pandemic. Therefore, these rates must not be ignored in studies on women's and children's rights.

Just like women, girls also have experienced violence and abuse. The common forms of abuse encountered by school-age girls have forced marriage and being forced to drop out of school, do heavy domestic work in the household, and care for children and elderly individuals.

On the other hand, answers such as "I don't know" and "no answer" given by the women and girls have much deeper meanings. Although the rates of these statements are not very high, girls need to be supported to move on and given a chance to tackle the challenging life conditions they experience. Therefore, there seems to be an urgent need for programs focusing on girls of both groups and striving to ensure access to the most basic human rights.

The most significant reasons why vulnerable families face violence and abuse more are long-term total lockdowns and restrictions and sharing physical space more in crowded households.

Additionally, poverty, unemployment, and high anxiety about the future point to potential violence in households.

The local and Syrian households in all three provinces have similar strategies to cope with the difficulties they experienced during the COVID-19 process. We know that they apply for techniques such as borrowing from acquaintances and relatives, selling investments, cutting expenses, and delaying needs other than very urgent health services in coping with economic difficulties. In the survey field where poor and low-income households live most, it will be necessary for public institutions and NGOs to work on household budgets for the economic recovery of families after the COVID-19 period because, according to the results, a huge debt and credit bubble are experienced, and its return to households will be staggering.

Both the locals and the Syrians mostly prefer official institutions on security-related issues. Although there has been a decrease in the requests for security and protection during the pandemic, security institutions must approach people by being aware of the traumatic process experienced to achieve the same levels of trust after the pandemic.

Although the locals and the Syrians state that they do not face discrimination in access to services to a large extent, there are still around 17% of the local and Syrian household members who say they encounter and feel this discrimination. Although this discrimination is mostly related to the COVID-19 process, ethnicity or being a refugee are still among the reasons. Therefore, prioritizing programs that will increase the coexistence and interactions of the Syrians in daily life will have vital functions.

In terms of mental health, it turns out that both groups are affected to varying degrees. Long-term lockdowns and social distance seem to have led to social or group autism while imprisoning individuals within the household. To overcome these, serious programs targeting groups and individuals are needed to improve their mental health through more socialization and interaction.

As to the housing and housing conditions of the households in all three provinces, almost all the Syrians are tenants. Despite living together in the same neighborhoods, the Syrians live in physically much worse houses, with an average of more crowded household sizes. The noteworthy result is that new families come and join the household during the COVID-19 process. Different families living in one household is a coping strategy for low-income families. Around one-third of the Syrian households in Şanlıurfa stated that new families had joined the household. In Kilis and Gaziantep, mostly the local families came together to live under a single roof.

Some of the biggest problems with housing are high rents relative to household income, constant demands of landlords to increase the rent excessively, finding new homes, and eviction from homes during the COVID-19 period. These difficulties are evident in both the local and Syrian tenants.

About 5% of the locals and the Syrians have needed legal support during the COVID-19 process. Divorce services, provision of TPID/IPID, and legal counseling in other areas were

mainly obtained from bar associations, NGO lawyers, and private law offices. The issue of legal support has been overlooked many times. Despite all the efforts to find a solution, there are still some problems related to access to the legal services that the poor local and Syrian individuals (primarily women) need at critical moments. Accurate and rapid intervention in cases of abuse, violence, and exploitation faced by women are issues that require profound expertise. The barriers of the patriarchal value system are also one of the biggest problems in meeting the legal needs of women. Therefore, it is vital for these vulnerable groups that bar associations, NGOs, and rights-based organizations reach out to women and take initiatives to solve their problems.

As to the income sources of the households, factories in Gaziantep, small businesses in Kilis, and small businesses and agricultural jobs in Şanlıurfa are more dominant. However, during the COVID-19 process, the Syrians are the ones who experience unemployment most, lose their income, or have to work for free.

The fact that the survey field is composed of poor neighborhoods shows the income imbalance and insecurity during the COVID-19 process are predominantly experienced in these places. The Syrian women and men are more vulnerable than the locals, but the differences between the two groups are not so high as to be significant. As stated before, during the COVID-19 period, both the local and Syrian households suffered from loss of income, became more indebted, resorted to cutting further expenses.

On the other hand, since COVID-19 is effective all over the country and the world, the severe disruption of remittances and money transfers, an essential income item for the poor local and Syrian families in the survey field, happened. These disruptions have caused poverty to be experienced more severely in this process. Furthermore, all the households' opportunities, such as food, transportation, education, and health, have also become limited. These factors have resulted in poverty being experienced even more severely.

According to the information obtained from the research field in all three provinces, poverty, combined with the COVID-19 conditions, can cause tensions to arise in the neighborhoods from time to time. Although there are different reasons for these tensions, prejudices against refugees are essential. For this reason, there is an urgent need for cohesion programs in the three provinces where a significant proportion of Syrians live, which will bring both communities together, increase interaction, and reduce the impact of prejudices and unfounded rumors about refugees.

The questions directed to the children reveal that this is a process that school-age children experience very negatively. According to the gathered data, almost all of them want face-to-face education. Furthermore, the research findings indicate that remote learning processes have been very insufficient due to limited infrastructure and technical opportunities and crowded household sizes.

Furthermore, the language learning processes of the Syrian students were adversely affected, and the positive effects of face-to-face education on cohesion could not emerge.

School, the classroom, and the teacher are powerful platforms for the integration and cohesion of refugee children and their families into the local social system. However, the COVID-19 process has seriously eliminated these platforms for a certain period. Therefore, for the cohesion and integration of children, it is crucial that official institutions and NGOs develop programs that include children, parents, schools, teachers, and students from both groups.

In conclusion, the COVID-19 process has had an impact that has seriously shaken both the locals and Syrians in all three provinces and pushed them further back from their current position. Moreover, it has sabotaged the cohesion and integration processes in the three provinces where the refugee population is significant.

According to our findings, all vulnerable groups, from children to women, disabled to refugees, have experienced this process more severely than others. Moreover, the effects of this challenging process seem to make themselves felt in all cores of life in the coming years. Therefore, it will be vital for the future of these three provinces, communities, groups, and the country that the public institutions, NGOs, and all rights-based organizations have severe planning, cooperation, and agreement on achievable and feasible goals.

***Cover Image:*** An Interviewer in Bey Mahallesi

*By Celil Ökeli & Zeynep Berfin Korkmaz*